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 Last November, this country was saved from an impending 
disaster, when the President signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2015 into law on November 2, 2015.1 Before that, it looked like the 
Social Security Disability Trust Fund would default. Default could 
have been disastrous, not only for beneficiaries, but for our entire 
economy.   
Although most Americans consider Social Security as a unitary 
program, two separate trust funds are involved:  
 
1. the Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance (OASI) program and  
 
2. the Social Security Disability (DI) program.2 
 
Old-age benefits were enacted in 1935 and have been paid 
monthly since 1940.3  Benefits for disabled workers were established 
in 1956 and a separate trust fund has been maintained since then.4  
This paper concentrates on the DI Fund. 
 The 2014 Trustees’ Annual Report projected that the DI Trust 
Fund reserves would have been depleted in the fourth quarter of 
2016, and the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds would have been 
depleted in 2033.5   
                                                            
* Administrative law judge, United States Department of Labor; past Federal 
Administrative Law Judges’ Conference (FALJC) president and FALJC liaison 
member of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); past chair, 
National Conference of the Administrative Judiciary, Judicial Division, American 
Bar Association (ABA); and former long-time member of the ABA House of 
Delegates. Author, Breaking Up With Cuba: The Dissolution of Friendly Relations 
between Washington and Havana, 1956-1961, 4 INT’L J. CUBAN STUD. 109 (2012).  
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Labor or any other 
organization. 
 Congress Passes H.R. 1314, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, SOC. SEC. 
LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN, 114-18 (November 3, 2015).  
  DI refers to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) also known as Title II 
benefits, named for the chapter title of the governing section of the Social Security 
Act. 
! Robert J. Myers, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Provisions: 
Summary of Legislation, 1935-58, 22 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 15, (1959). 
"  Id. at 20. 
# Informational Report: Disability Insurance Trust Fund, A-15-15-15024, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 3 (Dec. 1, 2014), 
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Until that time, given Congressional inaction, it appeared that 
default was inevitable.6 
                                                            
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-15-15-15024.pdf [hereinafter 
Informational Report]: 
DI Trust Fund reserves expressed as a percent of annual cost (the 
trust fund ratio) declined to 40 percent at the beginning of 2015, 
and the Trustees project trust fund depletion late in 2016, the 
same year projected in the last Trustees Report. DI costs have 
exceeded non-interest income since 2005, and the trust fund 
ratio has declined in every year since peaking in 2003. While 
legislation is needed to address all of Social Security’s financial 
imbalances, the need has become urgent with respect to the 
program’s disability insurance component. Lawmakers need to 
act soon to avoid automatic reductions in payments to DI 
beneficiaries in late 2016. 
Jacob J. Lew et al., A Summary of the 2015 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
(2015), http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/. This had been known for many years. See, 
Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, Publ’n No. 
4207, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-
congress-2011-2012/reports/43421-DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf. [hereinafter 
Publ’n No. 4207] CBO projected that DI outlays would peak in 2016 and taper off 
beginning in FY 2017.  Id. at 1.  
$ See Harold A. Pollack, Saving SSDI: As the disability-insurance program’s 
trust fund runs out of cash, there are new signs of internal reform—but more 
changes are needed.  THE ATLANTIC (August 31, 2015) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/ssdi-social-security-disability-
insurance/402475; Max Ehrenfreund, Social Security Disability Payments Will be 
Cut by a Fifth if Congress Doesn’t Act, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (January 7, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/social-
security-disability-payments-would-be-cut-by-a-fifth-without-new-action/. For the 
rationale in forcing DI Trust Fund default see Nicholas Ballasy, Greenspan: US 
'Way Underestimating' the National Debt, PJ MEDIA (May 30, 2015), 
http://pjmedia.com/blog/greenspan-u-s-way-underestimating-the-national-debt/ 
fund/2015/06/07/id/649228/. Al Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal 
reserve stated:  
 
The notion that we have a trust fund is nonsense – that trust fund 
has no meaning whatsoever except for the fact as an all private 
fund to benefit programs, if it runs out of money, you can only 
pay out in cash flows that come in but the probability that will 
happen is not particularly high.  
 
Dartagnan, Diary Entry Republicans Move To Gut Social Security Benefits on 
Their First Day in Power, THE DAILY KOS (Jan. 07, 2015), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/07/1356086/-Republicans-Move-To-Gut-
Social-Security-Benefits-on-Their-First-Day-in-Power#. 
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+)*-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 The President requested Congress to reallocate the Social 
Security payroll tax rate to avoid default in fiscal year (FY) 2016. 
Trust funds had been transferred between the two funds eleven times, 
most recently in 1994.7 In the proposed 2016 budget, President 
Obama proposed increasing the portion of the payroll tax going to the 
disability fund by 0.9 percentage point, redirecting $330 billion from 
the retirement fund over five years.8  
Employees and employers now each pay a 6.2% payroll tax that 
funds both the disability insurance trust fund and the much larger 
retirement-benefits fund, which is currently expected to be depleted 
in 2034.9   
                                                            
% Kristina Peterson, Parties Clash Over Social Security Disability Trust Fund, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/parties-clash-over-social-
security-disability-trust-fund-1423696405. 
& Id. 
' Id.  According to Ms. Peterson and the Wall Street Journal, the proposed 
administration budget proposal reallocation “would mean that both the [OASI and 
the DI] trust funds would be depleted in 2033, a year earlier than otherwise 
projected for the retirement fund.”  Id.; see also Informational Report, supra note 
5, at 3.  However, in response, House Republicans passed a rule prohibiting it 
unless steps were also taken to shore up Social Security’s overall finances.  See 
Kathy Ruffing & Paul N. Van de Water, Congress Needs to Boost Disability 
Insurance Share of Payroll Tax by 2016, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 
(July 31, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-16-
14socsec.pdf; Kathy Ruffing & Paul N. Van de Water, Boosting Disability 
Insurance Share of Social Security Payroll Tax Would Not Harm Retirees, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-2-14ss.pdf. William R. 
Morton, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of 
Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS.,10 
(2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43054.pdf, outlines an increase in the 
number of insured workers due to population growth and a rise in the percentage of 
the working-age population insured for disability resulted in an expansion in the 
size of the insured-worker population as factors for insolvency. He documents that 
“growth in the size of the female insured-worker population coincided with a rapid 
rise in the incidence rate of women in the [DI] program.”  Id. at 11. However, he 
also notes “SSA’s Chief Actuary projects that both male and female age-adjusted 
incidence rates should stabilize between five and six awards per 1,000 disability-
exposed workers in the future.”  Id. He also documents that “[b]eginning in 1996, 
working-age baby boomers increasingly entered their most disability prone years 
(aged 50 to full retirement age [FRA]), thereby shifting the age distribution of the 
insured-worker population from younger workers (aged 25 to 44) to older workers 
(aged 45 to FRA).”  Id.  He also documents that a “decreased likelihood of dying in 
a given year helped to increase the chance of an individual surviving to his or her 
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 This paper may provide some solutions to forego disaster.  
 There is often confusion about DI and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI). DI benefits are based on Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI),10 Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA), taxes collected from wage earners.11 At 
present, the maximum amount of earnings subject to the Social 
Security tax (the “taxable maximum”) is $118,500 for 2015.12 
Employers and employees each contribute 6.2 % to the taxable 
minimum to OASDI.13 Self-employed individuals pay the full 12.4% 
personally.14 “Of an estimated 168 million workers who will pay 
FICA taxes in 2015, about 10 million will pay higher taxes because 
of an annual increase in the taxable maximum.”15 In essence, the DI 
program is an “early retirement” policy for workers who meet the 
terms of a policy of “social insurance.”16 In order to qualify, as a 
predicate, workers must have paid enough OASDI taxes to be fully or 
currently insured17 and meet “disability” requirements. The definition 
of disability contains a duration test; if the impairment (1) is not 
expected to result in death, and (2) has neither lasted twelve months 
nor is expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months, the 
claimant is “not disabled.”18  In 2014, Social Security paid 141 
billion to almost 11 million disability beneficiaries and their family 
                                                            
most disability-prone years (aged 50 to FRA).”  Id.at 12. He also notes that dips in 
the economy, especially unemployment rates, is proportionate to increases in DI 
applications and awards.  Id. at 13-14; see also Publ’n No. 4207,  supra note 5, at 4 
(Congressional Budget Office “(CBO) in conjunction with the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated the budgetary effects of a variety of 
potential modifications to the DI program.”). This paper also addresses several 
budgetary effects of DI program modifications. 
 Lew, supra note 5. 
 Imposed on both employees and employers to fund Social Security and 
Medicare.  Id. 
  Id. 
! Including Medicare, each contributes a total of 7.65% for a total of 15.3%.  
Id.  Also, as of January 2013, individuals with earned income of more than 
$200,000 ($250,000 for married couples filing jointly) pay an additional 0.9 
percent in Medicare taxes. Id. 
"  Id. 
# Id. 
$ Morton, supra note 9, at 2.  
% 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)-(b) (2012). 
& See 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 !+)*-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members.19 When recipients become eligible for DI, they also 
become eligible for Medicare.20 Disabled workers are paid from the 
DI fund at the same rate as retired workers until the full retirement 
age is met, when they are converted to OASI beneficiaries.21 SSA 
annually adjusts benefit levels to account for inflation through Cost-
of-Living Adjustments (COLA), as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).22 At 
one time retirement age was 65; now it is 66 and will eventually 
increase.23 More than 450,000 people between ages 65 and 66, who 
under former law would have achieved full retirement, currently 
receive DI benefits.24 
 “Eligibility for [DI does not take accumulated wealth or passive 
income, such as the benefits paid by a long-term disability (LTD) 
                                                            
' Peterson, supra note 7 (paraphrasing Acting Social Security Commissioner 
Carolyn Colvin). 
  Twenty-nine months from the date of onset.  Morton, supra note 9, at 3. 
Also eligible are disabled widow(er)s and disabled adult children (grown children 
of a retired, disabled, or retired worker who suffered onset of a disabling 
impairment before age 22), two smaller categories who also qualify under Title II 
of the Social Security Act.  See id. at 7. 
  Kathy Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance is Vital to Workers with 
Severe Impairments, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 3 (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-9-12ss.pdf. 
   20 C.F.R. § 404.272(a)(1). 
 ! In a legislative fix in 1983, Congress incrementally increased the full 
retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 67, thereby expanding the maximum penalty for 
taking early retirement at age 62 from a 20% to a 30% reduction in cash benefits 
(based on year of birth). Morton, supra note 9, at 21. 
 " Statistics should become available to show whether many recipients enrolled 
in DI primarily because they did not have medical insurance prior to Obamacare 
and needed Medicare. Nearly five percent of all DI beneficiaries are between the 
age of sixty-five and sixty-six.  Ruffing, supra note 21 at 3. After Congress 
increased the age requirement for OASDI from sixty-five to sixty-six, “under the 
rules in place a decade ago,” the six-five year olds “would have been receiving 
retirement benefits instead.”  Id.  The author argues that although the 
administration did not concentrate on resolving the impending default, 
demographics explain most of the growth. Id. at 2 “Baby boomers into their high-
disability years.” Id.  She notes that more women are now qualified for disability 
benefits, and that “this has been a large factor behind the increase in the number of 
DI beneficiaries.”  Id. at 3.  It is also reasonable that poor labor market prospects 
due to changes in the nature of work and the 2008 recession contributed.  Id. at 4. 
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insurance policy, into account when determining eligibility.”25 Some 
private disability insurance policies require that the insured apply for 
DI benefits and, if received, LTD benefits will be offset by the 
amount of DI.26 Some LTD policies permit collection of benefits 
after a recipient is qualified for DI, but many others do not.27 In many 
cases, LTD policies cut the DI benefits once a recipient is approved. 
LTD benefits are not governmental benefits subject to offset.28 
 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a welfare type program, a 
federal income supplement program funded by general tax revenues 
not Social Security taxes.29 SSI is designed to help aged, blind, and 
disabled people, who have little or no income; and provides cash to 
meet basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter.30  The Social 
Security Administration (SSA) considers an applicant’s income and 
resources to establish eligibility for SSI.31 Payments to SSI recipients 
do not affect the DI trust fund in any manner because they are funded 
separately.32 When a recipient is eligible for SSI, they are also 
usually automatically eligible for state Medicaid.33 However, SSA 
offsets SSI benefits based on receipt of other public benefits, 
including DI cash benefits.34  
 Some recipients are entitled to both DI and SSI. This is because 
although the recipient is currently and fully insured, the OASDI 
                                                            
 # Dell Markey, Can You Combine Social Security Benefits and Long-Term 
Disability Policy?, ZACKS,  http://finance.zacks.com/can-combine-social-security-
benefits-longterm-disability-policy-7804.html. 
 $  See also Disability Insurance, CANCER LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER (2008), 
https://disabilityrightslegalcenter.org/sites/disabilityrightslegalcenter.org/files/about
/documents/DisabilityInsuranceNational.pdf. 
 % See also Markey, supra note 25. 
 & DI 52125.005 Benefits Not Considered a Public Disability Benefit (PDB), 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 28, 2009), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0452125005. 
 ' William R. Morton, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVS. (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32279.pdf.  
! Id. at 5. 
! Id. at 6-7. 
!  Id. 
!! Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI And Other Government 
Programs, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2015), https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm. 
!" Rene Parent, Profile of Social Security Disabled Workers and Dependents 
Who Have a Connection to Workers' Compensation or Public Disability Benefits, 
Research and Statistics Note No. 2012-03, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 2012), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2012-03.html. 
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contribution did not generate a significant DI benefit because the 
amount of DI benefits depends on the amount of contribution.35 
 On the other hand, benefits paid to disabled workers and their 
families may be reduced for receipt of certain public disability 
benefits such as Workers' Compensation.36 Benefits to family 
members may be limited by a family maximum benefit.37 
 If the DI Trust Fund defaults, current and prospective recipients 
would receive only about 80% of their current income.38 The DI 
Trust Fund was a year away from default in . . . 1994, when 
Congress reallocated the Social Security 12.4% payroll tax rate, 
providing a little more for DI, but no change in the total tax rate.39 
The 1995 Trustees Report projected that DI Trust Fund reserves 
would remain adequate until 2016.40 The number of DI recipients 
tripled since 1980, and doubled since 1995.41  
The Disability Insurance Trust Fund finished the first quarter of 
2015 with $54.3 billion in U.S. government bonds. This was down 
$5.9 billion from the end of 2014.42 The Disability Insurance Trust 
Fund had lost $6.4 billion in the first quarter of 2014.43  
Internal SSA documents disclosed:  
[a]bsent another act of Congress, the Social Security Act does not 
permit further inter-Fund borrowing. The Social Security Act also 
specifies that benefit payments shall be made only from the Trust 
                                                            
!# Id. at 3.  
!$ Id. at 6-7. 
!% 20 C.F.R. § 404.403  
!& Informational Report, supra note 5 at 7.  The author is skeptical of the 
Inspector General’s assessment that the quick fix would be used. 
!' Ruffing & Van de Water, supra note 9, at 1-2. Trust funds have been 
transferred between the two funds eleven times, most recently in 1994. Id. at 2. 
" The Financing Challenges Facing the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program Before the Ways and Means Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 113 Cong. 1 (2013) 
(statement by Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin.),  
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/testimony/HouseWM_20130314.pdf. 
" Ruffing, supra note 21 at 2 (figure 1 illustrates this).  
"   Trust Fund Data First Calendar Quarter of 2015, SOC. SEC. ONLINE., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/cgi-bin/ops_series.cgi (follow “Single time period” 
hyperlink; then search year field for “2015” and select calendar quarter 1) 
[hereinafter Trust Fund Data]. 
"! Charles T. Hall, Updated Disability Insurance Trust Numbers, SOC. SEC. 
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://socsecnews.blogspot.com/2015/04/updated-disability-
insurance-trust-fund.html. 
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Funds (that is, accumulated Trust Fund assets and current tax 
income). Consequently, if the Social Security Trust Funds become 
depleted—that is, if current tax income and accumulated assets are 
not sufficient to pay the benefits to which people are entitled— 
current law would effectively prohibit full Social Security benefits 
from being paid on time. The Agency would then have to decide 
whether to pay disabled beneficiaries 81 percent of their scheduled 
benefits on time, delay benefit payments until enough funds are 
available, or determine another alternative.44 
 In 2001, President G.W. Bush appointed a Commission on Social 
Security to focus on Social Security privatization.45 In 2005, at the 
start of his second term, President Bush formally proposed Social 
Security privatization as a cure for expected shortfalls.46 Michael J. 
Astrue was confirmed by the Senate as Commissioner on February 2, 
2007. 47 Andrew G. Biggs, former assistant director of the CATO 
Project on Social Security Privatization and who had written 
favorably about privatization of the DI program, was appointed 
Principal Deputy Commissioner to Mr. Astrue in 2007.48 
 During this time, and most especially after 2008, more attention 
was paid to backlogs in the disability system than in impending 
default of the DI trust fund.49  Actually, DI trust funds were in 
                                                            
"" Informational Report, supra note 5 at 7. 
"#The 2001 President’s Reform Commission, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2001), 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/pcsss/pcsss.html. 
"$ State of the Union, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (2005), http://georgewbush-
hitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2005/. 
"% Mr. Astrue previously served SSA as Counselor to the Commissioner, 
served in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as General Counsel 
and as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation, was former Associate 
Counsel to the President of the United States at the White House in the Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush administrations. In the private sector, He practiced law and 
was as a senior executive at several biotechnology companies and also had been a 
member of ACUS. Michael J. Astrue, Social Security, SOC. SEC. ONLINE PRESS 
OFFICE. https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/astrue.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2016).  
"& In 2005, Mr. Biggs was Associate Director of the National Economic 
Council; he worked on Social Security “reform” for the White House and, in 2001, 
had been on the staff of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 
a euphemism for privatization. Andrew G. Biggs, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE (2016), https://www.aei.org/scholar/andrew-g-biggs/. 
"' Improving Social Security Disability Insurance Claim Processing in Ohio 
Before S. Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov. Mgmt., 
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surplus until the economic downturn in 2008.50 In the preceding 
fourteen years the system was entirely self- supporting.51 When the 
program runs a surplus, excess funding is available that year.52 The 
excess funds are diverted to the trust funds, in the form of treasury 
bonds.53  
Federal law requires that all excess funds be invested in interest-
bearing securities backed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States. The Department of the Treasury currently invests all program 
revenues in special non-marketable securities of the U.S. 
Government which earn a market rate of interest. The balances in the 
trust funds, which represent the accumulated value, including 
interest, of all prior program annual surpluses and deficits, provide 
automatic authority to pay benefits.54  
The trust funds do not represent a legal obligation to individual 
program recipients, and Congress could cut or raise taxes on such 
benefits if it chooses.55  Trust funds are considered "intra-
governmental" debt, a component of the "public" or "national" debt.56 
                                                            
the Fed. Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement 
of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r of Soc. Sec.), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63865/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg63865.pdf.  See also Hearings Backlog Reduction Update, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (2009), www.socialsecurity.gov/appeals/congressional-booklets.html 
# Table 1. 
# See Trust Fund Data, supra note 42. 
#  Social Security Trust Fund, WIKIPEDIA (2016), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_Trust_Fund. 
#! See Lew, supra note 5. 
#" Id.  
## Social Security Trust Fund, WORLDLIBRARY.ORG, 
http://www.worldlibrary.org/Article.aspx?Title=Social_Security_Trust_Fund (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
#$ See David Pattison, Social Security Trust Fund Cash Flows and Reserves, 
75 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 1, 1 (2015). 
The Social Security trust funds date back to the “Old-Age 
Reserve Account,” established under the 1935 Social Security 
Act. The act authorized Congress to appropriate funds to the 
reserve account and separately established a new payroll tax 
sufficient to provide those funds. However, because a recent 
Supreme Court decision (unrelated to Social Security) had raised 
questions about the constitutionality of appropriating the tax 
revenues directly to the reserve account, the act did not explicitly 
earmark those revenues to the account. Nevertheless, it was 
understood that Congress would simply appropriate the tax 
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 In 2010, President Obama empaneled a Commission to study 
Social Security, but it did not make specific recommendations to 
reform the DI or SSI programs.57 However:  
The Commission recommends a comprehensive redesign of the 
DI program to modernize both the program objectives and the 
eligibility criteria to better provide adequate and appropriate support 
to the disabled community without putting in place barriers to work 
and full community participation.58 
“The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform,” December, 2010.59 
 In 2011 and 2012, as part of an economic stimulus package, the 
federal government temporarily reduced employees' share of payroll 
taxes from 6.2% to 4.2% of compensation.60 A resulting shortfall was 
appropriated from the general Government funds. This increased 
public debt, but did not advance the year of depletion of the Trust 
Fund.61 
                                                            
revenues for that purpose even without a statutory requirement to 
do so. By the time the act was first amended in 1939, the 
constitutional questions had been resolved, and the 1939 
amendments provided for automatic appropriation of the payroll 
taxes to the reserve account. Under both the 1935 act and the 
1939 amendments, the accumulated reserves were invested in 
interest-bearing Treasury securities, with the interest accruing to 
the reserves.  
Id. 
#% Obama Fiscal Social Security Proposals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ObamaFiscal/SocialSecurityProposals.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
#& Id. 
#' The Co-Chairmen were former Clinton Administration Chief of Staff 
Erskine Bowles and former Republican Senator Alan Simpson. Many, if not most 
of the members disagreed with major aspects of the report, and although they 
issued separate statements, none specifically addressed the DI program. See 
generally Member Statements, FISCAL COMM’N (2010), 
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/Me
mberStatements.pdf.  
$ Microhistory of Employee Benefits and Compensation, AON (Jul. 2013), 
 http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/LR-F-July-
13_Microhistory_of_Employee_Benefits_and_Compensation.pdf. 
$ See Social Security Trust Fund supra note 55 (citing Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, sec. 
601(e), (Jan. 5, 2010).  See also A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. 
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 An increase in claims had long been predicted, but SSA failed to 
plan ahead and if anything was guilty in mismanagement of the entire 
disability trust fund.62 Even after the initiation of the Obama 
administration’s Presidential Commission, SSA’s pending hearing 
backlog grew from about 694,000 cases at the end of June 2010 to 
approximately 955,000 at the end of June 2014.63 Average processing 
                                                            
AND MEDICARE BDS OF TRS,(2014), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr14summary.pdf.. 
$  Most of the increase comes from the aging of the “baby boomer,” post-
World War II, generation. CBO, Policy Options 2012. Also approximately 37% of 
those eligible retire at age 62. See Rodney Brooks, What age is the best age to start 
drawing Social Security benefits. The truth is, it depends. WASH. POST (Jun. 28, 
2014),  http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-age-is-best-to-start-
drawing-social-security-benefits-truth-is-it-depends/2015/06/25/42d2aca2-1923-
11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html?tid=hpModule_79c38dfc-8691-11e2-9d71-
f0feafdd1394.  A high percentage of that number immediately applies for DI.  See 
Appendix 1. 18 % take benefits at full retirement age (66 for most baby boomers), 
and only 3 % at age 70. Brooks, supra note 62. 
$! In his Congressional testimony in 2013, Mr. Goss related that the number of 
disabled worker beneficiaries increased from 2.86 million in 1980 to 8.20 million 
in 2010, an increase of 187 percent (while the number of workers rose by just 39 
percent). Several main “drivers” have caused this disproportionate increase in the 
number of beneficiaries: 
• The first driver is the 41-percent increase in the total 
population at ages 20 through 64 between 1980 and 2010, which 
roughly matches the increase in workers. 
• The second driver is the changing age distribution described 
above, which resulted in a 38-percent increase in “prevalence” of 
disability. (The gross disability prevalence rate grew 38 percent 
more than the age-sex-adjusted prevalence rate between 1980 and 
2010.) 
• The third driver is the percent of the population at ages 20 
through 64 that is disability insured. Since 1970, the disability 
insured population grew substantially as increasing numbers of 
women worked consistently and stayed insured. Between 1980 
and 2010, the percent of the “disability-age” population that was 
insured rose from about 50 to 68 percent for women, but declined 
from about 77 to 74 percent for men. Overall, there was a net 8-
percent increase in the number of disabled worker beneficiaries. 
This increase is relatively small because the proportion of the 
population that is undocumented (and far less likely to become 
disability insured) rose substantially between 1980 and 2010.  
Soc. Sec. Admin. before the H Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Soc. 
Sec. (2013) (statement of Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin.). 
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_031413a.html. 
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time on hearings also increased from 415 days in June 2010 to 437 
days in June 2014.64 SSA managers are accused of awarding benefits 
to reduce case backlogs.65  The pressure to reduce backlogs may have 
had a direct effect on outcomes.66 However, Mr. Astrue, the former 
Commissioner, and Carolyn W. Colvin, the current Commissioner, 
have each testified that 99% of Social Security disability payments 
are accurate.67 
 The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to 
perform “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) due to a medically 
determinable impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least 
one year or to result in death.68 SGA refers to the performance of 
significant physical or mental activities in work for pay or profit or in 
work of a type generally performed for pay or profit.69 SGA is a test 
for determining both initial and continuing eligibility for Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).70 In initial claims situations, if 
a claimant’s work is at SGA, then the claimant generally does not 
meet the definition of disability and does not receive benefits.71 
                                                            
$" Improve the Responsiveness and Oversight of the Hearings Process, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., http://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-investigations/top-ssa-management-
issues/social-security-disability-hearings-backlog.  
$# Clearing the Disability Backlog: SSA’s Administrative Law Judge and 
Hearing Office Performance, SOC. SEC, ADMIN.,(Sept. 16, 2008), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/clearing-disability-backog-
ssas-administrative-law-judge-and. 
$$ See Morton, supra note 9 especially, A Lack of Consistency in the Initial 
Determination Process, at 17-18. 
$% Soc. Sec. Testimony before the S. Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs Comm. 
(2010) (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r Soc. Sec.) SOC. SEC.  ADMIN., 
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/legislation/testimony_080410.html. 
$& Sections 223(d) and 1614(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§423(d)(1)(A) and 42 U.S.C. §1623(d)(1)(A).  See also 20 CFR Regulations No. 4, 
part P, §§ 404.1513, 404.1520, 404.1520a, 404.1545, 404.1546, 404.1560, 
404.1561, 404.1569a, and appendix 2; 20 C.F.R. No. 16, part I, §§ 416.913, 
416.920, 416.920a, 416.945, 416.946, 416.960, 416.961, and 416.969a. 
$' See Substantially Gainful Activity, SOC. SEC.  ADMIN., 
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/sga.html (last accessed Apr. 7, 2016).  
% Soc. Sec. Testimony before the Office of Research Demonstration, and 
Employment Support, (2015) (statement of the Hon. David Weave Assoc. 
Comm’r), SOC. SEC.  ADMIN. 
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_061615.html. [hereinafter Statement of 
Hon. David Weave]. 
% Id. 
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Countable earnings averaging over $1,090 a month (in 2015) 
demonstrate the ability to perform SGA in most cases.72 For 
claimants who are blind, countable earnings averaging over $1,820 a 
month (in 2015) usually demonstrate SGA for SSDI.73 
 SSA uses a process called the sequential evaluation that will be 
discussed below. If a claimant is engaged at SGA, then the claim is 
denied.74 The claims are initially evaluated by the district office (DO) 
in conjunction with state agencies, known as Disability 
Determination Services or “DDS.”75 Claims of claimants in SGA 
should not be forwarded for further review, per step 1 of the 
sequential evaluation.76 
 Based on a longitudinal tracking of 2.6 million disability claims 
filed in calendar year 2008, approximately 76% of all allowances 
occurred at the initial or reconsideration levels.77 SSA authorizes 
each DDS to purchase medical examinations, X-rays, and laboratory 
tests on a consultative basis to supplement evidence obtained from 
the claimants’ physicians or other treating sources when medical and 
nonmedical evidence is insufficient to make a disability 
determination.78 SSA reimburses the DDS for 100% of allowable 
expenditures up to its approved funding authorization for costs.79 
DDS withdraws federal funds through the Department of the 
Treasury’s Automated Standard Application for Payments system to 
pay for program expenditures.80  
 Statistics show that the initial DI allowance rate is very high for 
younger individuals, ranging from 60% to 70% at ages 18 – 23.81 As 
stated earlier, more than 450,000 people between ages 65 and 66, 
                                                            
%  Id. 
%! Id. 
%" Id. 
%# Id. 
%$ See Statement of Hon. David Weave, supra note 70. 
%%  See Carolyn W. Colvin, Statement for the Record ,H. COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM (Jun. 11, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Colvin-Statement-SSA-Disability-Appeals.pdf 
%& Audit Report: Administrative Costs Claimed by the 
Tennessee Disability Determination, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (2013), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-04-12-
11298.pdf. 
%' Id. 
& Id. 
& Meseguer, infra note 102.  
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who under former law would have achieved full retirement, currently 
receive DI benefits.82 The increase in retirement age has probably 
been a significant factor in the increase in DI claims. 
 A RAND study estimated that up to 60% of applicants “could 
have received a different initial determination from at least one other 
examiner in the DDS office.”83 Although the appeals process 
mitigated some of this variation, the study concluded that up to 23% 
of claimants could have ultimately received a different outcome had 
another examiner in the DDS office performed the determination.84 
 The RAND Corporation study found that of the denied claimants 
who contested their initial determination, 75% had their denial 
overturned eventually on appeal.85 Although DDS examiners base 
                                                            
&  Statistics should become available to show whether many recipients enrolled 
in DI primarily because they did not have medical insurance prior to Obamacare 
and needed Medicare. Ms. Ruffing points out that nearly five percent of all DI 
beneficiaries – are in DI status. After Congress increased the age requirement for 
OASDI from 65 to 66, under the rules in place a decade ago, the 65 year olds 
would have been receiving retirement benefits instead. Ruffing, Social Security 
Disability Insurance Is Vital to Workers With Severe Impairments, supra note 21. 
She argues that although the administration did not concentrate on resolving the 
impending default, demographics explain most of the growth. Baby boomers have 
aged into their high-disability years.  She notes that more women are now qualified 
for disability benefits, and that this has been a large factor behind the increase in 
the number of DI beneficiaries. Id. It is also reasonable that poor labor market 
prospects due to changes in the nature of work and the 2008 recession contributed.  
&! U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means, Social Security, Third in a Hearing 
Series on Securing the Future of the 
Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 2nd sess. 112-
SS14, (Mar. 20, 2012), (testimony of Nicole Maestas) p. 3, 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/nicolemaestas_ss_3_20_12s.pdf. See 
also Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, & Alexander Strand, Does Disability 
Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? 
Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt, 
Working Paper WR- 
853.3, RAND CORP., 11 (2012), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR853-3.html [hereinafter Maestas et 
al.]. 
&" Note that although the RAND study found that 23% of applicants could 
have received a different outcome, there is no guarantee that the applicants would 
have received a different decision had their cases been assigned to a different DDS 
examiner. 
&# Maestas et al., supra note 83, at. 22. They also found that the employment of 
marginal program entrants would have been on average twenty-eight percentage 
points higher two years after the initial determination had they not received SSDI. 
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their initial determinations on uniform guidelines established by 
SSA, regional differences in demographic, health, and employment 
characteristics may produce variation in initial allowance rates 
between DDS offices.86 The RAND study found variation in 
determination outcomes across examiners within the same DDS 
office.87 
 None of these studies established the effect of representation in 
the eventual outcome of a case. The percentage of DI and SSI 
claimants represented by attorneys at hearings has doubled since 
1977, while the use of non-attorney representatives has stayed in the 
10-20 percent range, although it has seen a steady increase since 
2007.88 The figures for attorney and non-attorney representatives are 
                                                            
This figure drops to 16 percentage points four years after the initial determination. 
However, these estimations reflect economic and labor market conditions between 
2005 and 2006, and therefore may relate to the December 2007 to June 2009 
recession. Id. 
&$ SSA has identified several variables that affect differences geographically. 
For example, the age of the population; it is logical to expect higher allowance 
rates with an older population. “The only variable used in the analysis that could be 
considered partially internal to the program is the percentage of applications based 
on physical (as opposed to mental) impairments. It is internal in the sense that it 
refers to a characteristic of the claimant rather than of the population. Although this 
variable is largely independent of the claims process, an element of subjective 
judgment exists in the classifying of disability cases. The analysis nevertheless uses 
this variable because there is no corresponding characteristic that can be measured 
in the state population.” Alexander Strand, Social Security Disability Programs: 
Assessing the Variation in Allowance Rates, ORES Working Paper no. 98, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., (Aug. 2002), 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp98.html. See also Norma B. Coe 
et al., What Explains Variation in SSDI Application Rates?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT 
RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., WP#2011-23, http://crr.bc.edu/working-
papers/whatexplains- state-variation-in-ssdi-application-rates/. Historically, the 
lowest participation in SSDI has been in Utah. The states with the highest 
percentage of applications per population are West Virginia, Mississippi and 
Arkansas. Five states enacted employer temporary disability insurance (TDI) 
mandates prior to the first year of data included in this analysis: California (1946), 
Hawaii (1969), New Jersey (1948), New York (1949), and Rhode Island (1942).  
According to Coe, et al, holding all else constant, the five states that mandate 
employer TDI should have lower SSDI application rates. Id. 
&%  Maestas et al., supra note 83, at 23. 
&& Aspects of Disability 
Decision Making: Data and Materials, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf. [hereinafter Aspects 
of Disability Decision Making]. 
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not additive since some claimants may have both.89 At the hearing 
level and in the court appeals, effective representation may actually 
be the most important outcome variable.90 
 Another outcome variable is state policy. There is wide variation 
in SSD entry across states, with some states having entry percentages 
twice as high as others.91 At present claimants who file in some states 
                                                            
&' Filing for Social Security Disability Benefits: What Impact Does 
Professional 
Representation Have on the Process at the Initial Level, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY 
BD., 60 (2012), http://www.ssab.gov/ 
Reports/Third-Party-2012-Full.pdf. 
'  By the time a case gets to hearing, a good lawyer can create an 
overwhelming record. Even in an imperfect record, after the fact, good claimant 
lawyers may be able to overcome any agency decision in the current posture. Under 
the law, even if claims are appealed and lost at every level, including the United 
States Supreme Court, the decision may very well be reopened through 
modification. As people get older, it is expected that the human body will 
deteriorate. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988 provides that a claim may be opened within a year 
of filing the initial claim for any reason, or within 4 years for good cause. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.989.   Good cause for reopening: 
   (a) We will find that there is good cause to reopen a determination or 
decision if -  
  (1) New and material evidence is furnished; 
New evidence very well may be supportive narrative reports or statements 
from physicians whose opinions were discounted in the case decision.  
'  David Stapleton & Frank Martin, Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road to 
Social Security Disability: Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative 
Data, WP 2012-269, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN RETIREMENT RESEARCH CTR. (2012), 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp269.pdf. For an earlier 
study see  Alexander Strand, Social Security Disability Programs: Assessing the 
Variation in Allowance Rates ORES Working Paper No. 98, SSA DIV. OF POLICY 
EVALUATION, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, OFFICE. OF 
POLICY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.(Aug. 2002). The major findings include the following: 
•In 1997–1999, states with the highest and lowest allowance rates for 
DI, SSI, and concurrent applications differed by about thirty percentage 
points. 
•States that have the highest and lowest allowance rates for DI or SSI 
tend to retain that status over time, although some changes in ranking do 
occur. 
•States with high filing rates tend to have low allowance rates, and 
vice versa. 
•Adjusting for economic, demographic, and health factors cuts the 
variation in allowance rates among states in half. 
•The variation in the prevalence of disability beneficiaries in the 
population has only a minimal ability to explain allowance rates. 
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have a 70% chance of receiving an award, considering all levels, 
initial, recon, ALJ, USDC and US Cir.92 In other states, claimants 
have a 70% chance of losing at all levels.93 
 For example, in 2010 the percentage of cases decided favorably 
for DI-only applicants ranged from a high of 59% in New Jersey to a 
low of 34% in Tennessee.94 For SSI-only disability claims in 2010, 
allowance rates ranged from 56% in Alaska to 24% in Mississippi.95 
For concurrent DI-SSI claims, allowance rates ranged from 40% in 
New Hampshire to 16% in West Virginia.96 The variation in 
allowance rates may reflect different characteristics of claimants or in 
the nature of industry in a particular area (e.g. mining, 
manufacturing, farming, etc.)97 SSA should investigate the allegation 
that many states merely pass on determinations in many claims that 
should be awarded below. 
 The Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB or Board) has been 
tracking the variation in allowance rates by state and adjudicative 
stage, and suggested changes.98 As stated earlier, claimants who file 
in some states have a 70% chance of receiving an award, considering 
all levels, initial, recon, ALJ, USDC and US Cir.99 In other states, 
                                                            
•The allowance rates in most states are relatively close to the rates 
predicted by demographic and socioeconomic factors. 
•States that deviate from their predicted rates tend not to do so 
consistently. 
Id.. [Note that I have asked many times for updated information, without 
success.] 
'  Id. 
'! Many courts reject the entire process. See Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 
2d 943 (E.D. Wis. 2013) judicial rejection for the process may be the 
administrative law equivalent to jury nullification. 
'" Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2010), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2010/di_asr10.pdf [hereinafter 
Annual Statistical Report on SSDI]. 
'# Id. 
'$ Id. 
'% See Aspects of Disability Decision Making, supra note 88, at 43-44. See also 
Stapleton & Martin, supra note 91. 
'& See Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: 
The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN, VOL. 73, NO. 2 (2013), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html 
'' See Annual Statistical Report on SSDI, supra note 94. 
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claimants have a 70% chance of losing at all levels.100 There is no 
way to justify the statistics.101 
The Board advocates strengthening the federal or state 
arrangement to decrease the large disparities that exist between 
different states regarding staff salaries, educational requirements, 
training, and attrition rates. The Board also recommends reforming 
the hearing process by establishing uniform procedures for claimant 
representatives; having the government represented at the hearing 
level or above; and closing the record after the decision, so that cases 
do not change substantially at each level of appeal.102 
 Mr. Morton, for the Congressional Research Service, and Ms. 
Ruffing, formerly of the Congressional Budget Office, have provided 
the most thorough research on potential outcomes for the DI program 
to date.103 Most of the growth in the program over the past twenty 
years has stemmed from increases in disabled worker beneficiaries, 
from around 2.9 million to almost 8.6 million—an increase of 
196.6%.104 Conversely, the number of spouses of disabled workers 
on DI decreased 64.5% during this period (from almost 461,900 to 
more than 164,000).105 The number of children of disabled workers 
receiving benefits expanded rather modestly compared with disabled 
workers, increasing 35.7% (from nearly 1.4 million in 1980 to 
roughly 1.9 million in 2011).106 There is no doubt that there are more 
DI applicants and recipients.107 However, a close reading of DI Trust 
Fund sources shows that any increases were predictable and, if 
                                                            
 Id. 
 See Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Wis. 2013). 
  Javier Meseguer, Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability 
Insurance Program: The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN, VOL. 
73, NO. 2 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html.  
According to the literature, state allowance rates depend on the economic, 
demographic, and health characteristics of the applicants, which vary among the 
states. For instance, states with older populations are anticipated to have higher 
disability allowance rates on average. Older applicants are more likely to qualify 
because of the higher prevalence of age-related disabilities and the fact that they 
face less stringent program standards than do younger individuals. From my 
experience, some states simply do not want to develop the record.  
! See Morton, supra note 9.  
" Id. 
# Id. 
$ Id. at 8. 
% See Morton, supra note 9. 
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anything, SSA policy in the period from 2002 to 2013 accelerated the 
problem. 
 The following are suggestions to help resolve the impending 
default: 
 
I. RECOMMENDATION ONE: SSA AS A CHARITY. 
 
 This proposal does not require any legislation or rulemaking. 
Although the trust funds provide retirement income, they also support 
needed resources to widows, orphans and the disabled among us.108 
Donations to the trust funds are tax deductible.  
 Donations have been possible since a legislative fix in 1972.109 
The managing trustee of the OASI and DI funds may accept money 
gifts or bequests for deposit. Section 170(c)(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code lists the U.S. government among the educational or 
charitable organizations to which donations are acceptable to receive 
a tax deduction.110 Gifts must be unconditional, except that the donor 
may designate the DI Trust Fund. If the donor does not designate the 
DI Fund, SSA will credit it to the OASDI Trust Fund. 
 Donations may not make the fund solvent, but they can slow 
down the rate of decline. SSA should include donation information in 
their literature.111 The costs that would be involved to fully 
implement this proposal should be negligible. 
 
II. RECOMMENDATION TWO: INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CONTINUING 
DISABILITY REVIEWS (CDRS) PERFORMED BY SSA. 
 
 Had Congress appropriated sufficient DI CDR funds and had 
SSA properly administered them since 2004, there would, in essence, 
have been no threatening DI Trust Fund default. Every Congress has 
discussed the issue of funding CDRs since 1994, when the DI fund 
was restored to solvency, but little has been done. Congress has been 
                                                            
&See Donations to the Social Security Trust Funds, SOC. SEC.ADMIN.,  
http://www.ssa.gov/agency/donations.html#a0=2 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
' Before 1972, bequests naming Social Security or a trust fund as a 
beneficiary could not be accepted, which caused problems in administration of 
some estates. 
 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2015). 
 See Daniel F. Solomon, Social Security: Maybe Charity Should Begin at 
Home? 22 VOICE OF EXPERIENCE  no. 4, 6-7 (2008). The paper was written for 
lawyers, especially those who are involved with wills and trusts. 
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“penny wise and pound-foolish.” Expansion of CDRs can remedy the 
situation. 
 By the end of FY 2013, SSA had a CDR backlog of 1.3 million 
claims.112 Apparently, the backlog has continued at the same pace 
heading into FY 2016. DI recipients are to be re-evaluated every 
three to seven years to determine whether their medical condition has 
improved enough that they should no longer receive benefits.113 SSA 
estimates that for every $1 spent on medical CDRs, the yield is about 
$9 in savings to SSA programs as well as Medicare and Medicaid 
over 10 years.114 In FY 2013, 428,658 medical CDRs were 
completed; more than 115,000 of these, or about 27%, resulted in an 
initial cessation of benefits.115 
 If the 27% denial rate holds, the existing CDR law and 
regulations should be, standing alone, ultimately be sufficient to 
bring the DI Trust Fund into solvency.116 However, Congress has 
                                                            
  Examining the Ways the Soc. Sec. Admin. Can Improve the Disability 
Review Process Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, H. Subcomm. 
on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements (April 9, 2014) (statement of 
Inspector Gen. Patrick P. O'Carroll, Jr., Soc. Sec. Admin.) 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/testimony/O'Carroll%209%20Apr%202014%2
0Written%20Statement%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Inspector Gen. 
O’Carroll Jr.]. Projected savings reflect the present value of future benefits for 
OASDI, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicare, and Medicaid as of 
September 30, 2010. Projected savings do not take into account the lifetime 
benefits of terminated beneficiaries processed outside SSA’s central release system. 
The $9.3 to $1.0 savings-to-cost ratio is calculated by dividing OC Act’s projected 
future savings of more than $3.5 billion by the $381 million spent on periodic 
CDRs in FY2010. However, see the discussion infra, suggesting that the MIRS 
medical improvement requirement be scrapped. Letter from Michael Astrue, 
Comm’r Soc. Sec., to Hon. Joseph R. Biden Jr., President of the S. (May 1, 2012), 
http://ssa.gov/legislation/FY%202010%20CDR%20Report.pdf. See also Annual 
Report of Continuing Disability Reviews, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2012), 
http://ssa.gov/legislation/FY%202010%20CDR%20Report.pdf.  [hereinafter 
Annual Report of Continuing Disability Reviews].  
! Reviewing Your Disability, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2015), 
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10068.pdf. 
" Id. In 2012, the estimate was about $10 for each $1. 24 Annual Report of 
Continuing Disability Reviews, supra note 112.  
# Id. 
$ The Future Financial Status of the Social Security Program, SOC. 
SEC.BULLETIN, VOL. 70, NO. 3 (2010), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p111.html. 
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underfunded CDRs, especially since 2004, and should appropriate 
enough funding to maximize savings.  
 In Budget Justifications to Congress, SSA asserts that it: 
 
• Completed 429,000 full medical CDRs in 2013;117 and  
• Completed over three million overpayment actions118 and 
• Planned for 888,000 full medical CDRs in 2015.119 
• Planned to increase to 908,000 in FY 2016.120 
 
 However, under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which 
was to provide SSA’s integrity funding through FY2021, funding is 
limited.121 The base SSA program integrity funding ($273 million) 
and the SSA cap adjustment ($1,166 million) were proposed to be 
                                                            
% Carolyn Colvin, Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees 
Fiscal Year 2015: Fulfilling Our Commitments to the American People, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (2014), http://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY15Files/2015FCJ.pdf.   
& Id. 
' Id.   
  Carolyn Colvin, FY 2016 Budget Overview, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY16Files/2016BO.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
  Please see research from Kathy Ruffing, who has concentrated in this area 
for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities after twenty-five years at the 
Congressional Budget Office, where she analyzed a wide range of topics including 
interest costs and federal debt, federal pay, immigration, and Social Security. She 
advises that an adjustment must be made because the Budget Control Act included 
a special “cap adjustment” for such activities. These cap adjustments set aside a 
limited amount of money that Congress can use solely to increase SSA funding for 
program integrity purposes, which include CDRs and SSI redeterminations of 
financial eligibility. These limited funding increases do not require offsetting 
reductions in other non-defense appropriations; in effect, such increases are outside 
the statutory caps on annual non-defense appropriations that the Budget Control 
Act established. . See Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance Is Vital to 
Workers With Severe Impairments, supra note 21.   Subsequent papers cover that 
demographic changes account for the bulk of the program's growth, while some 
other analyses appear to tell a different story. These differences largely reflect 
variations in the measure of DI growth that the studies use, the factors considered, 
and the time period analyzed. Thus, there is no single correct answer to "how much 
of DI's growth stems from demographic factors?" Kathy Ruffing, How Much of the 
Growth in Disability Insurance Stems from Demographic Changes? CTR. ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4080. 
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funded through discretionary appropriations in 2016 because the cap 
adjustment was fully funded for 2015.122 
 Many impairments are progressive and, as people age, the 
probability for improvement lessens. For most claims, SSA uses a 
Medical Improvement Review Standard (MIRS), which requires that 
the agency must show medical improvement before benefits can be 
terminated.123  
SSA shall terminate disability benefits “only if such finding is 
supported by: 
 
(1) Substantial evidence which demonstrates that— 
 
(A) There has been any medical improvement in the individual’s 
impairment or combination of impairments (other than medical 
improvement which is not related to the individual’s ability to work), 
and 
(B) The individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity. 

 Among the issues for evaluation at the time a claim is filed are 
the nature of the alleged impairment and the age and occupational 
experience of the claimant.124 Some impairments can be controlled or 
even cured. However, to any reasonable degree of probability, CDRs 
are more effective for younger claimants than older.125 People are 
                                                            
   In a joint resolution, S. Con 11, setting forth the congressional budget for 
the United States Government for FY2016 and setting forth the appropriate 
budgetary levels for FY2017 through 2025. See Table 2. 
 ! Congress passed the standard as part of the Social Security Disability 
Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (DBRA 1984; Pub. L. No. 98-460) – legislation 
passed by a unanimous, bipartisan vote in both the House of Representatives (402-
0) and the Senate (99-0) in September 1984, and was enacted when signed by 
President Reagan on October 9, 1984. See also, Soc. Sec. Act §§ 223(f), 
1614(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(f), 1382c(a)(4). A number of exceptions to 
application of the MIRS were provided in the legislation, including cases where the 
prior decision was “in error.” If fraud was involved, benefits can be terminated 
retroactively and the individual may be referred for further sanctions. 
 " Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence, 
Final Rules; 56 FR 36932, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 1991), 
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/II-04/II-4-1-2.html.  
 # The typical DI beneficiary is in his or her late fifties (0% are over age fifty, 
and 30% are sixty or older) and suffers from a severe mental, musculoskeletal, or 
other debilitating impairment. Age data for December 2011, from the Social 
 !+)*-					( 165
roughly twice as likely to be disabled at age fifty as at age forty, and 
twice as likely to be disabled at age sixty as at age fifty.126 MIRS 
does not apply to SSA Age-eighteen Redetermination cases.127  
After a recipient qualifies as disabled, SSA is required to conduct 
periodic CDRs to determine whether the individual continues to be 
disabled. However, SSA generally cannot find an individual’s 
disability has ended without finding medical improvement has 
occurred. As such, diaries are set for six to eighteen months when 
improvement is expected, up to three years when improvement is possible, 
and five to seven years when improvement is not expected.128
                                                            
Security Beneficiary Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/beniesQuery.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016); 
diagnostic data from Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability 
Insurance Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2011), 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/sect01c.pdf. Nearly one-
quarter of beneficiaries lack a high school diploma, and only ten percent have a 
four-year college degree and labor-market prospects for such applicants are poor. 
See Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance is Vital to Workers with Severe 
Impairments, supra note 21, at 4. “Program’s Growth Largely Due to Demographic 
Factors; Financing Should Be Addressed as Part of Overall Solvency”. 
 $ See Chart below.  Source: CBPP based on data from the Social Security 
Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary. 
 
 
 
 
 % DI 33025.075 Age 18 Redetermination Cases Under P.L. 104-193, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN. (Feb. 22, 2013), 
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0433025075. 
 & Examining Ways Social Security Can Improve the Disability Review 
Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/april9. 
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 If the recipient’s medical condition has improved and the 
recipient is no longer disabled according to its guidelines, SSA 
ceases benefits.129 There are several exceptions, including: 
 
• Advances in medical or vocational therapy or technology,130 
• Vocational therapy (any additional education or training that 
improves the individual’s ability to meet the vocational requirements 
of more jobs),131 
• New or improved diagnostic or evaluative techniques, and132 
• Substantial evidence demonstrates that any prior disability 
decision was made in error.133 
 
 Procedural exceptions also include: 
 
• Fraud or similar fault,134 
• Failure to cooperate or whereabouts unknown,135 and 
                                                            
 ' Id. 
! DI 28020.100 Advances in Medical or Vocational Therapy or Technology, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020100. 
! 28020.150 Vocational Therapy, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015), 
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020150. 
!  DI 28020.250 New or Improved Diagnostic or Evaluative Techniques, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020250. 
!! 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594. 
!" Fraud exists when a claimant (or any other person acting on the claimant’s 
behalf) with intent to defraud either makes or causes to be made a false statement 
or a misrepresentation of a material fact for use in determining rights to Title II or 
XVI benefits; or conceals or fails to disclose a material fact for use in determining 
rights to Title II or XVI benefits. Similar fault does not require fraudulent intent. It 
exists when a claimant or any other person either knowingly makes an incorrect or 
incomplete statement that is material to the determination or knowingly conceals 
information that is material to the determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(e)(1), 
416.994(b)(4)(i). SSA maintains a Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) 
Program, to investigate DI and SSI claims that state disability examiners believe 
are suspicious. The CDI program’s primary mission is to obtain evidence that can 
resolve questions of fraud before benefits are ever paid. CDI Units also provide 
reports to DDS examiners during CDRs that can be used to cease benefits of in-
payment beneficiaries. 
 !# A failure to cooperate or whereabouts unknown issue may arise at any 
point during a CDR when a disabled individual does not furnish medical or other 
evidence, fails to attend a consultative examination by a certain date, or cannot be 
located. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(e)(2)-(3), 416.994(b)(4)(ii)-(iii). 
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• Failure to follow prescribed treatment.136 
 
 Medical CDRs declined by 65% from FY2004 to 2008, resulting 
in a significant backlog.137 According to Inspector General (IG) 
reports, SSA would have saved at least $556 million during calendar 
year 2011 had SSA had conducted the medical CDRs in the backlog 
when they were due.138 Had CDRs been initiated in 2004, when the 
appropriations and the concentration on CDRs diminished, it is 
reasonable that the solvency of the DI fund would have been 
extended beyond the expected 2016 drop-dead date.139 
 It is reasonable that the five to seven years evaluation for those 
whose improvement is not expected means that most claimants near 
“advanced age” should not be re-evaluated. However, for those who 
became disabled when they were younger, evaluation should yield a 
huge return on the investment, i.e. appropriations targeted to this 
group.  
 For FY2014, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, 
SSA received about $1.2 billion in dedicated program integrity 
funding, and recent information received from the Agency suggests 
that it planned to complete 510,000 medical CDRs.140 
 SSA has preliminarily reported it would need $11.8 billion in 
funding over the next ten years to eliminate the medical CDR 
backlog by FY2018 and prevent its recurrence through FY2023.141 
                                                            
!$ If treatment can restore the ability to work, an individual must follow 
prescribed treatment to receive benefits. If prescribed treatment is not followed 
without good cause, SSA should cease benefits when performing a CDR. 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1594(e)(4), 416.994(b)(4)(iv). 
!% Statement of Inspector Gen. O'Carroll Jr., supra, note 112. 
!& Id. 
!' The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 authorized 
additional funds for CDRs but only for fiscal year (FY) 1996 through FY2002. In 
FY2003, the additional funding for CDRs lapsed and SSA shifted its focus away 
from CDRs toward processing the growing number of initial disability claims. As a 
result, the number of 
medical CDRs performed by SSA dropped from an all-time high of 876,802 in 
FY2000 to 207,637 in FY2007, before climbing back up to 443,233 in FY2012. 
Morton, supra note 9 at 6 (citing Social Security Administration, Performance and 
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2003, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 10, 2003), 
http://www.ssa.gov/finance/.  
" Id. 
" Examining Ways Social Security Can Improve the Disability Review 
Process, supra note 128. 
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Under this scenario, the DI fund can be salvaged.142 In order to 
expedite savings to the DI Trust Fund, resources should initially be 
directed only to those younger individuals who received an award at 
“Step 5” of the sequential evaluation, those who do not have a 
condition that meets or equals a listed impairment.143 The CDR 
program should also be integrated with certain return to work 
initiatives discussed more fully below that could target those who can 
easily be returned to work while increasing the efficiency of 
                                                            
"  Id.  
"! See Bernard Wixon & Alexander Strand, Identifying SSA's Sequential 
Disability Determination Steps Using Administrative Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Jun. 
2013), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2013-01.html.  
 From Table 1, the following process is extracted: 
 
ER = expedited reinstatement; 
PP = provisional period.  
“If an adult is not actually working and his impairment matches or is 
equivalent to a listed impairment, he is presumed unable to work and is awarded 
benefits without a determination whether he actually can perform his own prior 
work or other work.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990). “If the claimant 
wins at the third step (a listed impairment), she must be held disabled, and the case 
is over.” Jones v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2003); See 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1520(d) (“If you have an impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement 
and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you 
disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
, g p
Step 3: Meets or equals 
the Listings?     330,383 13.6 
A1 Allow Impairment meets the Listings 271,278 11.1 
B1 Allow Impairment equals the Listings 59,105 2.4 
Step 4: Capacity for past 
work?     499,238 20.5 
H1 Deny Capacity for SGA, past relevant work—ER/PP met 448,993 18.4 
H2 Deny 
Capacity for SGA, past relevant work—ER/PP not 
met 50,245 2.1 
Step 5: Capacity for any 
work?     1,042,622 42.8 
C1 Allow Medical vocational considerations 408,301 16.8 
D1 Allow 
Medical vocational considerations—arduous 
unskilled work 310 0.0 
G1 Deny 
Capacity for SGA, vocational considerations—
reentitlement period met 34,131 1.4 
G2 Deny 
Capacity for SGA, vocational considerations—
reentitlement period not met 1,225 0.1 
J1 Deny Capacity for SGA, other work—ER/PP met 529,680 21.7 
J2 Deny Capacity for SGA, other work—ER/PP not met 68,975 2.8 
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adjudication. E.g., fewer resources would be needed to effectuate the 
adjudication process for those who do not qualify for vocational 
rehabilitation (VR) programs. 
 However, added funding for the CDR program is a low risk 
investment that should be pursued vigorously.  

III. RECOMMENDATION 3: TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RETURN-TO-WORK 
INCENTIVES. 
 
 SSA should proactively offer rehabilitation services to every 
applicant and beneficiary for DI.  
Legislation recently offered would amend the Act to authorize the 
Commissioner to give individuals denied OASDI and SSI benefits 
based on an adverse determination of disability any information on 
appropriate public or private entities that provide employment 
services, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support 
services.144 In some states, this is already standard operating 
procedure.145 
 Another bill would mandate that SSA develop public online tools 
to assist beneficiaries.146 These tools would permit individuals 
eligible for disability benefits to assess the impact of earnings on the 
individual's eligibility for, and amount of, benefits received through 
Federal and State benefit programs. 
 I would support both. However, more importantly, agency 
rulemaking to address current law is required that would be more 
effective. For example, although 20 C.F.R. Section 416.1710 referral 
                                                            
"" Promoting Opportunity for Disability Benefit Applicants Act, H.R.2135, 
114th Cong. (2015-2016). 
"# See discussion of the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, as amended, infra, 29 
U.S.C. 943, et seq. Every American is entitled to use employment services. The 
Act is implemented through DOL, Employment and Training Administration 
regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 652 and Parts 660 through 671.  See also Stapleton and 
Martin, Table B.1., in Appendix B  Percentage of the 2002 New VR Applicant 
Cohort Ever Awarded SSD at Application, from Application to Closure, and from 
Closure to 60 Months After Application, by State of Application. See also, the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) (discussed in more detail, 
infra.) effective July 1, 2015, requires Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) and programs under the Second Chance Act to be mandatory partners in a 
mandatory “One-Stop” VR system. This would include SSI applicants but may not 
include many DI applicants.  
"$ Promoting Opportunity Through Informed Choice Act, H.R. 1795, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
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for state vocational rehabilitation services (VR) exists “on the 
books,” it is not enforced and there is no equivalent in the DI 
regulations:147  
Whom we refer and when: 
(a) Whom we refer: If you are 16 years of age or older and under 
65 years old, and receiving SSI benefits, we will refer you to the 
State agency providing vocational rehabilitation services. If you are 
under age 16, we will refer you to an agency administering services 
under the Maternal and Child Health Services (Title V) Block Grant 
Act.148 
(b) When we refer: We will make this referral when we find you 
eligible for benefits or at any other time that we find you might be 
helped by vocational rehabilitation services.149 
 SSA should expand it for Title II claims and enforce this 
provision for certain younger individuals.150 This is especially true 
because the percentage of DI allowances based on vocational, 
educational, and age-specific factors increased from 28 percent to 47 
percent in the ten years prior to 2009.151 It is reasonable that the 
mathematical progression for current claims has held and there is 
increased need to evaluate vocational factors. 
 Please note that although a claimant may not be able to return to 
past relevant work at Step 4 of the sequential evaluation and at Step 5 
vocational evidence shows that there are no “other” jobs a claimant 
can perform under current guidelines, SSA does not apply the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) principles in rendering a 
determination.152 Because some of the claimants cannot return to 
                                                            
"% 20 C.F.R. § 416.1110. 
"& 20 C.F.R. 416.1710(a). 
"' 20 C.F.R. 416.1710(b). 
# According to recent statistics, of the nearly 9 million disabled workers 
receiving benefits in 2012, the most recent year for which data is available, 193,042 
recipients tried working, according to SSA, to be taken off. Joseph Lawler, GOP 
plans overhaul for Social Security disability, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/gop-plans-overhaul-for-social-security-
disability/article/2560440.     
# Wixon & Strand, supra 143. 
#  SSR 83046c: Sections 216(i) and 224(d) (42 U.S.C. 416(i) and 423(d)) 
Disability Insurance Benefits – Inability to Perform Previous Work – 
Administrative Notice Under the Medial-Vocational Guidelines of the Existence of 
Other Work, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
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work, they may be entitled to an accommodation under the ADA.153 
According to the DOL Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in 2013, 
17.6 percent of persons with a disability were employed.154 In 
contrast, the employment-population ratio for those without a 
disability was 64.0 percent.155 The employment-population ratio was 
little changed from 2012 to 2013 for both groups.156 The 
unemployment rate for those with a disability was 13.2 percent in 
                                                            
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR83-46-di-02.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2016).  
#! The ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in 
employment, transportation, public accommodation, communications, and 
governmental activities. The ADA also establishes requirements for 
telecommunications relay services. 
 DOL’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) provides publications 
and other technical assistance on the basic requirements of the ADA. It does not 
enforce any part of the law. 
In addition to the Department of Labor, four federal agencies enforce the 
ADA: 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces 
regulations covering employment. 
The Department of Transportation enforces regulations governing 
transit. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces 
regulations covering telecommunication services. 
The Department of Justice enforces regulations governing public 
accommodations and state and local government services.  
Another federal agency, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board (ATBCB), also known as the Access Board, issues 
guidelines to ensure that buildings, facilities, and transit vehicles are 
accessible and usable by people with disabilities. 
 Two agencies within the Department of Labor enforce portions of the ADA.  
• The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has 
coordinating authority under the employment-related provisions of the 
ADA.  
• The Civil Rights Center is responsible for enforcing Title II of the 
ADA as it applies to the labor- and workforce-related practices of state 
and local governments and other public entities. See the Laws & 
Regulations subtopic for specific information on these provisions. 
Americans with Disabilities Act, DEPT. OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/disability/ada.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
#" News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability: Labor 
Force Characteristics - 2013 (Jun. 11, 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disabl_06112014.pdf. 
## Id. 
#$ Id. 
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2013, higher than the rate for persons with no disability (7.1 
percent).157 The jobless rate for persons with a disability was little 
changed from 2012 to 2013, while the rate for those without a 
disability declined.158 
 Although the BLS statistics do not consider those eligible for DI, 
and does not show whether employers of the disabled need to 
accommodate an impairment, for many disabled people, an 
accommodation could return them to the current job and potentially 
provide a more lucrative occupational setting than in former work.159 
 Please consider the following: 
 
A. The Public Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program funded 
under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the primary Federal 
program assisting individuals with disabilities in securing 
competitive employment.160  This program is not the exclusive 
domain of the DI and SSI systems, although beneficiaries may take 
advantage of them. 
B. In 1992, Congress mandated a longitudinal study of VR.161  
The results demonstrated that: 
• 69% of VR consumers achieved employment as a result of VR 
services and 75% of those were working at jobs in the competitive 
labor market. 
                                                            
#% Id. 
#& Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Persons with a 
Disability: Labor Force Characteristics Summary- 2014,(Jun. 16, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm.  The data on persons with a 
disability are collected as part of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly 
sample survey of about 60,000 households that provides information on 
employment and unemployment in the United States. The Department of Labor’s 
Office of Disability Employment Policy sponsors the collection of data on persons 
with a disability. 
#' Id. 
$ See also Public Vocational Rehabilitation Before the H. Comm. on Edu. 
And Labor, Subcomm. on Higher Edu., Life Long Learning and Competativeness 
(2009) (statement of Steve Wooderson, Admn’r. Iowa Vocational Rehab Servs.), 
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/fil
es/documents/111/pdf/testimony/20090212StephenWoodersonTestimony.pdf. 
$ REHABILITATION SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (RSA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION UNDER CONTRACT NO. HR92022001(1992). 
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• 20.7% of VR consumers utilized assistive technology 
(specialized computerized devices, portable speech synthesizers, 
special software, etc.) in helping to enter the workforce. 
• Three years after job placement, 76% continued to be employed 
and received increases in salary and benefits. 
• Consumers earned an average of $7.33/hour; rate increased to 
$9.62/hour after three years (minimum wage is $5.15/hour) 
• Among individuals who completed VR services, 44% no longer 
needed public assistance.162 
 
C. Applicants are supposed to be told that they may contact the 
rehabilitation agency in their state directly at any time: 
  
a. The literature states: Your Social Security office will be glad to 
provide the location and phone number of the nearest office of the 
state vocational rehabilitation agency. Individuals then can let the 
agency know of their interest in receiving rehabilitation services to 
help them return to work. The address and phone number of the state 
vocational rehabilitation agency also can be found in the phone 
book.163 
b. However, this is not performed in many states. 
c. It is usually directed to recipients rather than applicants.164   
 
D. In order to expedite large numbers of cases, the sequential 
evaluation, for DI claims involving adult claimants is: 
 
Step 1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial 
gainful activity will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical 
findings.165 
                                                            
$  Id. 
$! See Working While Disabled—How We Can HELP, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
(2015), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10095.pdf. 
$"See What You Need To Know When You Get Social Security Disability 
Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2011), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-
10153.pdf.  See also Working While Disabled, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,  
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10095.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016); 
SSA 2015 Red Book, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2015), 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/redbook/documents/TheRedBook2015.pdf. 
$# 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2012). 
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Step 2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” 
will not be found disabled.166  
Step 3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a 
severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which 
"meets or equals” a listed impairment in “Appendix 1" of Subpart P 
of Regulations No. 4, a finding of disabled will be made without 
consideration of vocational factors.167  
• Appendix 1 contains a listing of impairments. 
Step 4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she 
has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made.168 
 Step 5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude 
the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, 
past work experience and residual functional capacity must be 
considered to determine if other work can be performed:169  
a. The “grid” rules set out in Appendix 2 of the Regulations are 
considered in determining whether a claimant with exertional 
impairments170 is or is not disabled.171 The regulations also provide 
                                                            
$$ 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2012). 
$% 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (2012). 
$& 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (2012). 
$' 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (2012). 
% Exertional. i.e. strength, categories: 
• Sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time 
and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and 
small tools. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). 
• Light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time 
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds. See 
Id. at § 404.1567(b). 
• Medium work involves lifting no more than fifty pounds at a time 
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to twenty-five 
pounds. See Id. at § 404.1567(c). 
• Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with 
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to fifty pounds. See Id. 
at § 404.1567(d). 
• Very heavy work involves lifting objects weighing more than 100 
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing fifty 
pounds or more. See Id. § 404.1567(e). 
% The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are a matrix system for handling 
claims that involve substantially uniform levels of impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 
Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. These guidelines are commonly known as the grids or 
tables that give a finding of disabled or not disabled for various combinations of 
age, education, and work experience. The grids provide a uniform conclusion about 
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that if an individual suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well 
as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining 
residual functional capacity.172 Residual functional capacity is the 
most a claimant can still do despite limitations.173 
b. The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional 
requirements and consist of three separate tables, one table for each 
category (sedentary work, light work, and medium work).174 If a 
claimant is found able to work the full range of heavy work this 
“generally is sufficient for a finding of not disabled.”175 Each grid 
presents various combinations of factors relevant to a claimant’s 
ability to find work. The factors in the grids are the claimant’s age,176 
education, and work experience.177 For each combination of these 
factors, e.g., fifty years old, limited education, and unskilled work 
experience, the grids direct a finding of either disabled or not 
disabled based on the number of jobs in the national economy in that 
category of physical-exertional requirements.178  This approach 
allows the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process 
and encourages uniform treatment of claims.179 
c. If a finding of disabled cannot be made based on strength 
limitations alone, the rules established in Appendix 2 are used as a 
framework in evaluating disability.180 In cases where the individual 
has solely a non-exertional impairment, a determination as to whether 
disability exists shall be based on the principles in the appropriate 
sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for 
specific case situations in Appendix 2.181 
                                                            
the availability of jobs for all persons whose medical condition is categorized in the 
same way.  
%  20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. 
%! Id. 
%" See Exertional categories, supra note 170. 
%# 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. 
%$ The grids consider three age categories: younger person (under age fifty), 
person closely approaching advanced age (age 50-54), and eighteen person of 
advanced age (age fifty-five or older). 
%% 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. 
%& Id. 
%' Id. 
& Id. 
& See Daniel F. Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social Security Hearings, 
18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES (1998) 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol18/iss2/2. 
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d. If claimant’s limitations are only non-exertional, the grids are 
inappropriate, and determination must rely on other evidence.182 If 
claimant’s limitations are both exertional and non-exertional, the 
determination is supposed to consult the grids first.183 If the claimant 
is disabled under the grids, there is no need to examine the effect of 
the non-exertional limitations.184 But if the same claimant may be not 
disabled under the grids, the non-exertional limitations must be 
examined separately.185  
E. A claimant can be determined to be disabled at steps 3 or 5.186 
At step 5 in the adult sequential evaluation the burden shifts from the 
claimant to SSA to show that considering age, education, past work 
experience and residual functional capacity other work can be 
performed that is substantial gainful employment, which exists in the 
regional or national economy.187 Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566, work 
that exists in the national economy is defined: 
                                                            
&  20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. 
&! Id. 
&" Id. 
&# Id. 
&$ Wixon & Strand, supra 143  
&% See, e.g., Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1988). At the 
hearing level, an administrative law judge must articulate specific jobs that the 
claimant is able to perform, and this finding must be supported by substantial 
evidence. (emphasis added.) Although rarely used at the DDS level, Vocational 
Experts (VEs) are used by administrative law judges at the hearing level to help 
determine step five of the sequential evaluation to in help determine the ability to 
perform other appropriate work in the labor market. VEs respond to hypothetical 
questions proposed by the judges and claimants’ representatives based on a 
hypothetical individual’s: age, education, work experience, skills and their residual 
functional capacity; See also Vocational and Medical Experts (Vocational Expert 
and Medical Expert Fees for Services, Office of the Inspector General of the Social 
Security Administration (A-06-99-51005) (2001). In FY1999 the SSA Office of 
Hearing and Appeals (currently the SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review, ODAR) had Blanket Purchase Agreements with 1,337 Vocational Experts 
and had made $21.6 million dollars in payments to Vocational Experts. These 
payments represented 3.1% of the $687 million operating budget in 1999. See also 
Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social Security Hearings, supra note 181. SSA 
has signed an interagency agreement with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS). More detailed information about the agreement see 
Occupational Information System Project, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016). Hypothetically, a new Occupational Information System (OIS) to 
update and/or replace the DOT is being developed. 
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(a) General. We consider that work exists in the national economy 
when it exists in significant numbers either in the region where you 
live or in several other regions of the country. It does not matter 
whether— 
 
(1) Work exists in the immediate area in which you live; 
(2) A specific job vacancy exists for you; or 
(3) You would be hired if you applied for work.  
 
(b) How we determine the existence of work. Work exists in the 
national economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one 
or more occupations) having requirements which you are able to 
meet with your physical or mental abilities and vocational 
qualifications. Isolated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers in 
relatively few locations outside of the region where you live are not 
considered “work which exists in the national economy.” We will not 
deny you disability benefits on the basis of the existence of these 
kinds of jobs. If work that you can do does not exist in the national 
economy, we will determine that you are disabled. However, if work 
that you can do does exist in the national economy, we will 
determine that you are not disabled.  
 
(c) Inability to obtain work. We will determine that you are not 
disabled if your residual functional capacity and vocational abilities 
make it possible for you to do work which exists in the national 
economy, but you remain unemployed because of:  
 
(1) Your inability to get work; 
(2) Lack of work in your local area; 
(3) The hiring practices of employers; 
(4) Technological changes in the industry in which you have 
worked; 
(5) Cyclical economic conditions; 
(6) No job openings for you; 
(7) You would not actually be hired to do work you could 
otherwise do; or 
(8) You do not wish to do a particular type of work. 
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(d) Administrative notice of job data. When we determine that 
unskilled, sedentary, light, and medium jobs exist in the national 
economy (in significant numbers either in the region where you live 
or in several regions of the country), we will take administrative 
notice of reliable job information available from various 
governmental and other publications. For example, we will take 
notice of:  
 
(1) Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the 
Department of Labor; 
(2) County Business Patterns, published by the Bureau of the 
Census; 
(3) Census Reports, also published by the Bureau of the Census; 
(4) Occupational Analyses, prepared for the Social Security 
Administration by various State employment agencies; and 
(5) Occupational Outlook Handbook, published by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
 
(e) Use of vocational experts and other specialists. If the issue in 
determining whether you are disabled is whether your work skills can 
be used in other work and the specific occupations in which they can 
be used, or there is a similarly complex issue, we may use the 
services of a vocational expert or other specialist. We will decide 
whether to use a vocational expert or other specialist.188 
When issued in 1980, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines were 
largely supported by the DOT.189 The DOT is supposed to identify 
jobs that claimants might be able to perform in light of their 
functional limitations and vocational characteristics. Unfortunately, it 
was last updated in 1991 and is most probably flawed.190  
If there are a significant number of jobs either in the region where 
the claimant lives or in several other regions of the country that 
match the claimant’s medical and vocational profile, then the 
claimant is “not disabled.” However, it is inappropriate to conclude 
that an older (typically age 50 and above) claimant can transfer to a 
                                                            
&& 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. 
&' 20 C.F.R. § 404(P)(2). 
' Although the Department of Labor replaced DOT with the Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET)—SSA determined O*Net does not contain 
definitive job information. Also, by all accounts, vocational profiles of claimants at 
the DDS level are often inaccurate.  
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different job in a wholly different industry that requires more than a 
minimal adjustment. If there are no jobs that claimant could perform 
at step 5 of the sequential evaluation, or if such jobs do not exist in 
sufficient numbers, then SSA has not met the shifting burden and 
claimant is “disabled.”191 
F. Trial work period.  After a person becomes eligible for 
disability benefits, the person may attempt to return to the work 
force.192 As an incentive, SSA provides a trial work period in which a 
beneficiary may have earnings and still collect benefits.193 During a 
trial work period, a recipient may test an ability to work and still be 
considered disabled.194 Services performed during the trial work 
period that would normally show the disability has ended are not 
considered until services have been performed for at least 9 months 
(not necessarily consecutive) in a rolling 60-month period.195 In 
2015, any month in which earnings exceed $780 is considered a 
month of services for an individual's trial work period.196 
G. Ticket to Work. SSA administers a voluntary VR program for 
persons aged 18 through 64 who already are in payment status.197 
The program permits recipients to keep benefits while they explore 
employment, receive vocational rehabilitation services, and gain 
work experience. Cash benefits and Medicaid or Medicare often 
continue throughout a transition to work, and there are protections in 
place to help regain benefits if the recipient is unable to continue 
                                                            
' Tom Johns, SSA’s Sequential Evaluation Process for Assessing Disability, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oidap/Documents/Social%20Security%20Administration.%20
%20SSAs%20Sequential%20Evaluation.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
'  Substantial Gainful Activity, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2016), 
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/sga.html. 
'! Id. 
'" Trial Work Period, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/twp.html. (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
'# SSA 2016 Red Book, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2016), 
https://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/ssdi-only-employment-supports.htm. 
'$ Trial Work Period, supra note 194.  
'% The SSA Ticket Act created two other programs, the Work Incentives 
Planning and Assistance (WIPA) program and the Protection and Advocacy for 
Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS) program, to supplement the assistance 
available at our field offices. The two programs authorize grants to organizations 
with ties to the disability community at the local level. 20 C.F.R. § 411.  
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working due to disability.198 SSA maintains an Office of Research, 
Demonstration, and Employment Support, which conducts research 
and analysis, administers employment support programs, and 
develops agency policies on work incentives.199 Unfortunately, this 
Office is underfunded and did not provide much support until 
recently.200  
H. Meanwhile, SSA is supposed to determine whether VR will aid 
a willing recipient.  
I. SSA states that for every dollar spent on VR, it receives $7 in 
return. According to the Council of State Administrators of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, the individuals who completed their VR 
service plans in 2012 and went to work earned approximately $3.5 
billion in wages during their first year of work.201 During that year, 
these new wage earners paid approximately $320 million in federal 
taxes; $95 million in state income taxes; and $520 million in Social 
Security and Medicare taxes (self and employer). These individuals 
will be able to pay back the cost of their rehabilitation services, 
through taxes, in just two to four years. In addition, many of these 
individuals will generate projected savings to the Federal Treasury 
and the Social Security Trust Fund of a projected $470.3 million in 
savings for one fiscal year.202  
J. However, the SSA statistics are based on only those already 
awarded benefits whereas the most effective time to address work is 
at the time of application, before an applicant is in payment status. 
                                                            
'& See Scott D. Szymendera & William R. Morton, About Ticket to Work, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33585 (2014), 
http://www.chooseworkttw.net/about/index.html.  
'' Organization Chart & Structure, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/organization.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
  See Accelerated Benefits Demonstration, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/accelerated.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).  
See also SSA 2016 Red Book supra note 194 (providing more information on 
SSA’s demonstration projects). 
 
   See Public Vocational Rehabilitation: An Investment In America, COUNCIL 
OF STATE ADM’R OF VOCATIONAL REHAB. (Jul. 9, 2013), 
http://www.rehabnetwork.org/?s=an+investment+in+America&submit=.  See also 
Investing in America: 2013-2014,, COUNCIL OF STATE ADM’R OF VOCATIONAL 
REHAB., http://www.rehabnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/Investing-in-America-
brochure-2013-2014.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
   Id. 
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SSA once developed a plan to conduct a test of early intervention 
services provided by state VR agencies to applicants as part of a 
broader early intervention test, but that plan was not pursued.203 For 
every dollar spent, SSA would get thousands back. Some researchers 
believe that savings could be in the billions of dollars. This, standing 
alone, could make the DI system solvent.204  
K. Moreover, there are no statistics to show the effect of the 
application of VR principles on CDR claimants. It could be that VR 
is being applied, but there is no evidence to substantiate it.  
L. Social Security administers a Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) 
Reimbursement Program.205  The following is a summary of the 
reimbursements Social Security made to State VR agencies by fiscal 
year206 

                                                            
 !  In fact, SSA ran a study in 2001-2003 with the Disability Research 
Institute, a research consortium. “Early intervention” was offered to a sample of 
applicants with “impairments that may reasonably be presumed to be disabling 
(i.e., they have a good chance at being approved Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) benefits) and who are likely to engage in Substantial Gainful 
Activity (SGA) as a result of the features of early intervention.” See DEBRA 
BRUCKER, EARLY INTERVENTION PROJECT: YEAR TWO REPORT, PROGRAM FOR 
DISABILITY RESEARCH, RUTGERS UNIV. (2002). A review of the report shows that 
it took Rutgers two years to discover that the Department of Labor (DOL) offered a 
“one-stop” or career center offices that could perform the entire function. 
 " David C. Stapleton & Frank Martin, Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road 
to Social Security Disability: Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative 
Data Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road to Social Security Disability: 
Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative Data, in MICHIGAN 
RETIREMENT RESEARCH CENTER RESEARCH PAPER 2012-269 (2012).  
 # Vocational Rehabilitation Cost Reimbursement Program, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/work/vocational_rehab.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2016). 
 $ See State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency Reimbursements, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN, http://www.ssa.gov/work/claimsprocessing.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
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 These figures show that more emphasis on VR was attributed for 
years prior to the Bush administration (when there were 
proportionally fewer DI beneficiaries) and prior to declines in the DI 
Trust Fund.  It is reasonable that the emphasis on VR contributed to 
surpluses in the DI Trust Fund for those periods. It is also reasonable 
that the decreased emphasis from 2004 onward contributed to the 
decline in the DI Fund. 
M. Meanwhile, in addition to the SSA VR system, every state has 
a mandated multi-funded VR program.207 The 1998 Workforce 
                                                            
 % A federal–state VR program partnership, administered by the federal U.S. 
Department of Education Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), currently 
gives approximately $3 billion annually to state agencies to provide a wide variety 
of vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with a broad spectrum of 
disabling conditions. These funds are not specifically dedicated for SSID and SSI 
applicants. E.g., David Dean, John V. Pepper, Robert M. Schmidt, & Steven Stern, 
State Vocational Rehabilitation Programs and Federal Disability Insurance: An 
Analysis of Virginia’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program, IZA J. LAB. POL’Y 
(2014). The researchers concluded, first, VR services are associated with lower 
rates of participation in disability insurance programs - a nearly two point drop in 
SSDI receipt and one point drop in SSI receipt. Second, VR service receipt is 
associated with lower take-up rates of SSDI/SSI. Finally, among VR applicants on 
SSDI/SSI, those who receive substantive VR services are more likely to be 
employed. 
Fiscal
Year* 
Claims 
Allowed 
Dollars  
Allowed 
Average Cost 
 Per Claim 
FY 14 9,451 $141,449,760.46 $14,966.64 
FY 13 9,645 $138,260,580.10 $14,334.95 
FY 12 5,343 $78,768,058.10 $14,742.29 
FY 11 4,679 $72,991,906.25 $15,599.89 
FY 10  7,768 $105,964,398.60 $13,641.14  
 FY 09  8,712 $122,268,833.39  $14,035 
 FY 08  9,325 $124,238,549.09  $13,323 
 FY 07  6,871 $90,263,129.56  $13,137 
 FY 06  8,387 $105,049,203.20  $12,525 
 FY 05  6,095 $75,635,939.94  $12,410 
 FY 04  6,811 $85,172,425.42  $12,505  
FY 03  6,760 $84,599,189.87 $12,514 
FY 02  10,527 $131,062,205.10 $12,450 
FY 01  8,208 $103,892,717.86 $12,657 
FY 00  10,220 $117,024,222.20 $11,451 
FY 99  11,126 $119,934,831.23 $10,780 
FY 98  9,950 $103,037,127.54 $10,355  
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Investment Act (WIA) was intended to incorporate a myriad of 
federal job training programs into a coordinated, comprehensive 
system.208  States were required to develop statewide and local plans 
that included the VR system in the planning process.209 Although 
Congress contemplated merging the VR system into the WIA, VR is 
maintained as a separate program by several agencies to meet the 
vocational training needs of people with disabilities.210 But, the 
vocational training opportunities of the state workforce investment 
system are clearly intended to be available to individuals with 
disabilities.211 The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 was 
reauthorized July 14, 2014 as P.L. 113-128, the Workforce 
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).212 Any service an 
individual receives from the VR system must be connected to an 
ultimate employment goal.213 People must show a mental, physical or 
learning disability that interferes with the ability to work.214 The 
disability need not qualify the person for DI or SSI benefits, but it 
must be a substantial impediment to employment.215 
N. Among the programs involved under WIOA are: Title I of the 
Act, Adult, Dislocated Worker and Youth programs216; Adult 
                                                            
 & The Workforce Investment Act of 1998: A Primer for People with 
Disabilities Development, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE (1999), 
https://labor.ny.gov/workforcenypartners/PDFs/WIA-Primer-Disabilities.pdf. 
 ' Id. 
  Id. 
  See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(A). 
   H.R. 803, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 ! See 29 U.S.C. § 722(a)(1) (2014). 
 " 29 U.S.C § 705(20)(a) (2014). 
 # 29 C.F.R. § 722(a)(3). Although VR services may be denied if a person 
cannot benefit from them, a person is presumed capable of employment, despite the 
severity of a disability, unless the VR agency shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that he or she cannot benefit from services. Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 
361.42(a)(2). 
 $ According to this provision, priority access to higher-intensity career 
services and training 
must be given to public assistance recipients, other low-income individuals, 
and individuals who are basic skills 
deficient. Previously, under WIA, local policies on priority of service varied 
widely. 
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Education and Literacy programs; the Wagner-Peyser Employment 
Service; and VR: Title I of the Rehabilitation Act programs.217 
O. In addition to SSA and Department of Education (DOE) 
involvement, DOL provides grants for re-entry into the job market.218 
Because some of the claimants cannot return to past relevant work, 
they may be entitled to an accommodation under the American 
Disabilities Act (ADA).219 DOL maintains a Job Accommodation 
                                                            
 % WIOA Overview, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
https://www.doleta.gov/wioa/Overview.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 &  See JAN'S SOAR INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://askjan.org/cgi-
win/typequery.exe?902 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (for a list of Vocational 
Rehabilitation Agencies). 
 ' The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination 
against people with disabilities in employment, transportation, public 
accommodation, communications, and governmental activities. The ADA also 
establishes requirements for telecommunications relay services. 
 DOL’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) provides publications 
and other technical assistance on the basic requirements of the ADA. It does not 
enforce any part of the law. 
In addition to the Department of Labor, four federal agencies enforce the 
ADA: 
• The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
enforces regulations covering employment. 
• The Department of Transportation enforces regulations 
governing transit. 
• The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces 
regulations covering telecommunication services. 
• The Department of Justice enforces regulations governing 
public accommodations and state and local government services.  
Another federal agency, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board (ATBCB), also known as the Access Board, issues guidelines to 
ensure that buildings, facilities, and transit vehicles are accessible and usable by 
people with disabilities. 
 Two agencies within the Department of Labor enforce portions of the ADA.  
• The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) 
has coordinating authority under the employment-related provisions 
of the ADA.  
• The Civil Rights Center is responsible for enforcing Title II of 
the ADA as it applies to the labor- and workforce-related practices of 
state and local governments and other public entities. See the Laws & 
Regulations subtopic for specific information on these provisions. 
Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 153.  
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Network (JAN) through the Office of Disability Employment 
Policy.220 
 
 
P. In 2014, DOL provided funding for the following:221 
 
1. The “Add Us In” initiative received a total of $2,774,116.222 
Each of the recipients led a consortium working to identify and 
develop strategies to increase the capacity of small businesses, 
including those in underrepresented and historically excluded 
communities, to employ youth and young adults with disabilities.223  
2. The West Virginia University Research Corp. in Morgantown, 
W.Va., received $2,499,901 to operate the JAN.224 JAN is a free and 
confidential consulting service that provides individualized worksite 
accommodation solutions and technical assistance spanning the 
complete range of disabilities and job functions to ensure compliance 
with the Americans with Disabilities Act and other disability-related 
legislation.225 It also provides information about self-employment 
and small business ownership opportunities for individuals with 
disabilities.226 
3. The Institute for Educational Leadership in the District of 
Columbia received $1,099,984 to operate the National Collaborative 
                                                            
   The Job Accommodation Process: Steps to Collaborative Solutions, U.S. 
DEPT. OF LABOR (Feb. 2009), http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/misc/job.htm. 
   News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, $8.4M in Continued Funding to 
Improve Employment Opportunities for People with Disabilities Announced by 
U.S. Labor Dept. (Sept. 11, 2014), , 
http://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/odep/odep20141699 [hereinafter News 
Release U.S. Dept. of Labor] 
    Id. 
  ! The eight recipients who are participating in this initiative are: 1) the 
National Organization on Disability in New York; 2) The WorkPlace Inc. in 
Bridgeport, Connecticut; 3) the TransCen Inc. in Rockville, Maryland; 4) the 
University of Illinois at Chicago in Chicago; 5) the University of Missouri — 
Kansas City in Kansas City, Missouri; 6) The University of Oklahoma in Norman, 
Oklahoma; 7) the Integrated Recovery Network in Los Angeles and 8) the World 
Institute on Disability in Berkeley, California. 
  " News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222. 
  # News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor Announces $2.5 
million Grant Opportunity to Manage, Operate Job Accommodation Network (Jul. 
19, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/odep/ODEP20121220.htm. 
  $ Id. 
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on Workforce and Disability for Youth.227 These funds will be used 
to continue the center's work building capacity within and across 
youth service delivery systems to improve employment and 
postsecondary education outcomes for youth with disabilities.228 The 
center will have three areas of focus going forward: 1) career 
exploration, management and planning; 2) youth development and 
leadership; and 3) professional development.229  
4. The National Disability Institute in the District of Columbia 
received $1,098,573 to operate the National Center on Leadership for 
Employment and Advancement of Citizens with Disabilities 
(LEAD).230 These funds support the LEAD Center's ongoing efforts 
to conduct policy and research initiatives focused on improving 
employment outcomes and economic advancement for individuals 
with disabilities.231 Additionally, these resources enable the LEAD 
Center to continue developing policies and guidance on best practices 
in retention and return-to work, customizing employment, and 
conducting policy analysis to ensure that American Job Centers 
nationwide are able to effectively serve job seekers with 
disabilities.232  
5. The Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology 
Society of North America in Arlington, Virginia, received $950,000 
to operate ODEP's Partnership on Employment and Accessible 
Technology (PEAT). PEAT is a multifaceted initiative working to 
advance the employment, retention and career advancement of 
people with disabilities through the development, adoption and 
promotion of accessible technology.233 
Q. Whereas SSA currently merely evaluates claimants for 
eligibility for DI or SSI, once VR eligibility (not necessarily DI 
eligibility) is established, the contracting VR agency supposedly 
develops a written plan establishing the individual's employment goal 
and the specific services to be provided to assist the individual to 
                                                            
  % News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222. 
  & Id. 
  ' Id. 
 ! Id. 
 ! Id. 
 !  Id. 
 !! News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222 
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reach that goal.234 An individualized plan for employment (IPE) must 
be established.235 This plan, developed by the claimant with 
assistance from the VR counselor, is reduced to writing.236 The 
assessment evaluates the unique strengths, resources, priorities, 
abilities and interests of the individual.237 The assessment can cover 
educational, psychological, psychiatric, vocational, personal, social 
and medical factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation 
needs of the individual.238 It may also include a referral for the 
provision of rehabilitation technology services, "to assess and 
develop the capacities of the individual to perform in a work 
environment."239 By law, the IPE is supposed be reviewed at least 
annually and amended if there are substantive changes in the 
employment outcome, the VR services to be provided, or the service 
providers.240 Any changes will not take effect until agreed to by the 
individual and the VR counselor.241  
R. Each IPE must indicate the expected need for post-employment 
services.242 Prior to a decision that an individual has achieved an 
employment outcome, there must be a reassessment of the need for 
post-employment services.243 If so, they are to be provided under an 
                                                            
 !" See Vocational Rehabilitation Services, SOUTH DAKOTA DEPT. OF HUMAN 
SERVS., https://dhs.sd.gov/drs/vocrehab/vr.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
       235 34 C.F.R. § 361.45 (2016). 
 !$ 34 C.F.R. § 361.46 (2001). 
 !% Id. 
 !& Id. 
 !' 34 C.F.R. § 361.5 (2016). 
 " Id. 
 " Id. 
 " Ronald M. Hager, Policy and Practice Brief: Order of Selection for 
Vocational Rehabilitation Services, CORNELL WORK INCENTIVE SUPPORT CTR., 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=e
dicollect (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 "! Post-employment services are defined as services provided after the person 
has achieved an employment outcome, which are necessary for the individual "to 
maintain, regain or advance in employment." 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(37) A note to 
the regulation indicates some possible circumstances in which post-employment 
services may be appropriate:  
Post-employment services are available to assist an individual to 
maintain employment, e.g., the individual's employment is jeopardized 
because of conflicts with supervisors or co-workers and the individual 
needs mental health services and counseling to maintain the employment; 
to regain employment, e.g., the individual's job is eliminated through 
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amended IPE.244 Therefore, there is no need for a re-determination of 
eligibility.245 A note indicates that post-employment services are not 
intended to be complex or comprehensive and should be limited in 
scope and duration.246 If more comprehensive services are required, a 
new rehabilitation effort should be considered.  
S. Special “work incentive” rules are supposed to make it possible 
for DI recipients to work and still receive monthly payments and 
Medicare or Medicaid similar to the Rehabilitation Act and WIOA.247  
Section 505(a) of the Social Security Disability Amendments of 
1980, Pub. L. 96-265, directed the Commissioner to develop and 
conduct experiments and demonstration projects designed to provide 
more cost-effective ways of encouraging disabled beneficiaries to 
return to work and leave benefit rolls.248 These experiments and 
demonstration projects were supposed to test the advantages and 
disadvantages of altering certain limitations and conditions that apply 
to title II disabled beneficiaries.249  
T. In these “experimental” programs, the Commissioner may 
waive compliance with the entitlement and payment requirements for 
disabled beneficiaries to carry out experiments and demonstration 
projects in the title II disability program.250 
U. The GAO has repeatedly determined that SSA had failed to 
develop and conduct experiments and demonstration projects in 
accordance with the regulations.251 
                                                            
reorganization and new placement services are needed; and to advance in 
employment, e.g., the employment is no longer consistent with the 
individual's strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, 
and interests. 
 "" Id. 
 "# See Id. 
 "$ State Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies and Their Obligation to Maximize 
Employment, NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVS. INC.,  (1999), 
http://nls.org/Disability/VocationalRehabilitation/StateVocationalRehabilitationAg
enciesMaximizeEmployment [hereinafter NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVS. INC.]. 
 "% 20 C.F.R. § 404.1599. 
 "& Id. 
 "' Id. 
 # Id. 
 # See Full Medical Continuing Disability Reviews, A-07-09-29147, OFFICE 
OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (Mar. 2010) 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/html/A-07-09-29147_7.html 
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V. At present, SSA has two demonstration projects: Benefit Offset 
National Demonstration (BOND) and Youth Transition 
Demonstration (YTD).252  
1. BOND tests a $1 reduction in benefits for every $2 in earnings 
over substantial gainful activity (SGA) levels, in combination with 
benefits counseling, with the goal of helping beneficiaries with 
disabilities return-to-work.253 The demonstration allows beneficiaries 
to face this gradual reduction in their benefits, eliminating the abrupt 
loss of cash benefits. BOND was initiated in January, 2011 and full 
implementation began in late April. 2011. A final report is due in 
2017.254 
2. YTD focuses on youths ages 14-25 who receive Supplemental 
Security Income, SSDI, or childhood disability benefits, or who are 
at heightened risk of becoming eligible for such benefits.255 YTD 
sites develop service delivery systems and partnerships with federal, 
state, and local entities to assist youth with disabilities to successfully 
transition from school, which may include post-secondary education, 
to employment and economic self-sufficiency.256 All six of the 
random assignment sites have completed YTD services.257 
W. “Subsidies" and "Special Conditions" refer to support on the 
job that could result in receipt of more pay than the actual value of 
the services performed.258  The value of subsidies and special 
conditions are deducted from earnings when SSA determines whether 
the work is at the SGA level.259 Following are examples of subsidies 
and special conditions:  
1. The recipient receives more supervision than other workers 
doing a similar job for the same pay.260  
                                                            
 #  SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164.  
 #! Id.  
 #" Id. 
 ## See SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164. 
 #$ Id. 
 #% See Youth Transition Demonstration, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/youth.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) 
(showing the 12-month and 24-month impact reports, as well as the final report, for 
all of the sites).  
 #& Subsidy & Special Conditions, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/subsidies.htm (last visited Apr. 
7, 2016).  
 #' Id. 
 $ See SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164. 
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2. The recipient has fewer or simpler tasks to complete than other 
workers who are doing the same job for the same pay.261 
3. The recipient has a job coach or mentor who helps perform 
some of the work.262 
X. All job applicants and employers are eligible for employment 
services funded through Wagner-Peyser allotments.263 Funding 
comes from the DOL Budget and the program is administered by the 
DOL Employment and Training Administration.264  Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) claimants are the largest customer component and 
have an opportunity to receive work skills assessments, counseling, 
and job and training referrals.265  Veterans and eligible spouses 
receive priority referral to jobs and training, as well as special 
employment services and assistance coordinated with the Veterans 
Administration.266 Special programs are also available that offer extra 
assistance to people who have the hardest time finding employment, 
such as the long-term unemployed, individuals with disabilities, at-
                                                            
 $ Id. 
 $  Id. 
 $! Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, as amended by the Workforce Investment Act 
of 1998, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., 
http://www.doleta.gov/programs/w-pact_amended98.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2016). As stated above, the program is administered through the WIA and the 
WOIA.  
 $"See Id. The statute states in part: 
b) It shall be the duty of the Secretary [of DOL, not SSA] to assure 
that unemployment insurance and employment service offices in each 
State, as appropriate, upon request of a public agency administering or 
supervising the administration of a State plan approved under part A of 
title IV of the Social Security Act, …  
(c) The Secretary shall--  
(1) assist in the coordination and development of a 
nationwide system of public labor exchange services, provided as 
part of the one-stop customer service systems of the States;  
(2) assist in the development of continuous improvement 
models for such nationwide system that ensure private sector 
satisfaction with the system and meet the demands of jobseekers 
relating to the system; and  
(3) ensure, for individuals otherwise eligible to receive 
unemployment compensation, the provision of reemployment 
services and other activities in which the individuals are required 
to participate to receive the compensation. 
 $# Id. 
 $$ Id. 
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risk youth, parents receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Family support, and dislocated workers:267 
1. Claimants for employment are supposed to receive individual 
treatment. Data elements are collected from claimants during the 
initial claims and/or work registration process and entered into a 
computer database that will be used to profile claimants. Necessary 
labor market information data would also be entered.268  
2. Claimants who have been issued a first unemployment payment 
are then profiled using a two-step approach. First, claimants who are 
on recall or who use a union hiring hall are excluded. Then, the 
remaining claimants are either identified or assigned a probability of 
dislocation through a statistical model process or additional 
characteristic screens.269  
3. A list of claimants who are potentially eligible for referral to 
Service Providers is then created by the State's computer system. If a 
statistical model is used, claimants are ranked, highest to lowest, in 
order of their probability of exhaustion of benefits. If characteristic 
screens are used, the result is simply a list of claimants considered 
likely to exhaust benefits.270  
4. The UI component and Service Provider jointly determine the 
number of profiled UI claimants to be selected and referred. This 
referral agreement establishes the number of claimants that can be 
referred and provided with reemployment services.271 
5. In order to create incentives to hire DI recipients and other 
priority claimants, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), a 
federal tax credit, is available to employers hiring individuals from 
certain target groups who have consistently faced significant barriers 
to employment. The maximum tax credit ranges from $1,200 to 
$9,600, depending on the employee hired.272 
                                                            
 $% Id. 
 $& Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., https://www.doleta.gov/programs/wprs.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 $' Id. 
 % Id. 
 % Id. 
 %  Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND 
TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016). 
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Y. Extrapolating the statistics, assuming that VR would be applied 
at time of application, reduced to present value, for the work life 
expectancy of an average successful beneficiary, the return on 
investment is probably more than $100 for each VR dollar spent and 
"takers" become "makers." Most recipients of VR will not draw from 
the fund, and will eventually pay into it. The recipients will also pay 
income taxes and increase personal consumption, allowing the 
process to ripple into other revenue streams. 
Z. VR agencies are considered the payer of last resort for many 
services. They will not pay for a service if a similar benefit is 
available through some other agency or program.273 If another agency 
refuses to provide a service that is within its area of responsibility, 
the claimant should not have to wait until that dispute is resolved 
before obtaining the service. In the above example, the IPE would list 
an item or service to be to be provided and indicate that it would be 
provided by SSA as a comparable benefit. If Medicaid then refused 
to provide it, the VR agency would be responsible for obtaining the 
device, pending resolution with SSA. This can easily be established 
as a contract item between SSA, the VR provider and the medical 
supplier.  
AA. Partial disability. DI is an “all or nothing” concept. From the 
beginning of DI, Congress has discussed “partial” disability.  
1. A worker can choose to retire as early as age 62, but doing so 
may result in a benefit reduction of as much as 30 percent.274 Many 
recipients receive a discounted retirement benefit at age 62, and at the 
time of application simultaneously file a DI application. If the 62-65 
year old claimant is approved for DI, the benefit amount for DI is 
awarded as if “full” retirement age, currently age 66, has been met. 
For a 62 year old, that amount is usually about 20% higher than the 
amount based on date of actual retirement.275 
a. One reason for the claim is, of course, the higher payment 
amount. 
                                                            
 %! See NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVS. INC., supra note 247. 
 %" The benefit is reduced 5/9 of one percent for each month before normal 
retirement age, up to 36 months. If the number of months exceeds 36, then the 
benefit is further reduced 5/12 of one percent per month. See Early or Late 
Retirement?, SOC. SEC. ONLINE (2008), 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/quickcalc/early_late.html.  
 %# Id. 
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b. Another reason may or may not be that as a DI recipient, the 
claimant will be eligible for Medicare (usually after 25 months from 
date of onset).276  
c. These claims, which many are questionable and difficult to 
adjudicate, clog the system. 
d. New developments such as Obamacare could reduce the 
number of claimants who are uninsured between ages 62-65, many of 
whom are in high risk insurance underwriter categories. 
e. Congress could easily prorate the amounts from age 62 to full 
retirement date. 
 In its 2012 Policy Report, CBO estimated great savings by 
preventing workers from applying for DI benefits after their 62nd 
birthday or from receiving awards if the date they become eligible for 
benefits after that birthday.277  
 I find that this would be extremely harsh for those who become 
disabled at that age. 
 SSA could establish an election whereby at ages 62-65 a claimant 
would elect either early retirement or DI at the prorated amount at 
retirement, but not both. Of course, this would not be applied 
retroactively. Because legislation and rulemaking is necessary, it will 
take many years to impact the DI Trust Fund.  
2. CATO proposes a program that would combine benefit offsets 
with variable wage subsidies.278 Under a “generalized benefit offset” 
(GBO), beneficiaries would choose when and how much to work 
according to their health conditions, labor market opportunities, and 
work abilities.279  
a. If a beneficiary has sufficiently high earnings in any period, he 
or she would receive a smaller benefit out of DI’s trust fund but 
would also receive a wage subsidy (from a different federal funding 
                                                            
 %$ If the eligibility for Medicare were lowered to age 62 from the current 65, I 
suspect that DI claims would drop precipitously. 
 %%  CBO estimated that this would affect about 500,000 people in 2022 and 
would reduce DI outlays by 
about $12 billion in 2022 and by about 6 percent in 2037. However, most of 
those budgetary savings would 
be offset by larger outlays for retirement benefits. 
 %& Jagadeesh Gokhale, SSDI Reform: Promoting Gainful Employment while 
Preserving Economic Security, 762 POLICY ANALYSIS, CATO INSTITUTE (October 
22, 2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa762_1.pdf 
 %'Id.  
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source) that increases with earnings up to a certain level well beyond 
SGA.280 Over that range, the earnings subsidy would increase the 
beneficiary’s income faster than the increase in earnings. Such a 
subsidy would provide a more robust work incentive. That payment 
structure should induce labor force reentry by beneficiaries who 
retain work abilities. However, it is likely to be effective only if SSDI 
benefits are restored when earnings decline, for whatever reason. 
Essentially, GBO would provide a flexible, prowork system of 
payments to those on SSDI.281 
b. CATO argues that a key advantage of GBO’s benefit structure 
is that it would incentivize recipients who can work to “self-select” 
into working rather than remaining out of the labor force, thereby 
inducing voluntary labor market choices that would better reveal 
beneficiaries’ work capabilities and are better suited to their 
economic preferences and opportunities.282 
c. From the literature, this suggestion is similar to using ADA 
principles in evaluation of claims and using the same methods 
currently employed by the Department of Labor Employment and 
Training Administration in evaluating and placing disabled 
applicants. The mechanism required by the CATO proposal to adjust 
benefit amounts based on income and other factors is employed at 
SSA in part when calculating SSI benefits. SSI recipients live “in a 
fishbowl” because they have a continuing duty to provide financial 
data as SSA calculates and recalculates benefit amounts based on the 
amounts of income and resources available to the recipient.283 This 
creates millions of cases of underpayment and overpayment that may 
or may not be appealed through the same system used to adjudicate 
DI. 
d. If the CATO system were applied, recipients would need to 
produce financial record and employers would have to continually 
report. From my perspective, the current SSI system is de-
                                                            
 & Id. 
 & Id.  
 &  Id.  
 &! Richard Balkus, James Sears, Susan Wilschke, & Bernard Wixon, 
Simplifying the Supplemental Security Income Program: Options for Eliminating 
the Counting of In-kind Support and Maintenance, 68, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 15  
(2008), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v22n1/v22n1p15.pdf. 
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humanizing, because of the inference that recipients need constant 
monitoring and supervision.284 
e. From the literature, CATO has not scored the proposal.285  
f. Because of the need to adjust amounts of benefits and wage 
subsidies, given an added expense of SSA labor and without showing 
it is cost productive, it is difficult to see how this would benefit the 
Trust Fund. The proposal is also limited to recipients, those already 
adjudicated as disabled.  
a. Also, this is analogous to a workers’ compensation concept 
known in most states and under some Federal Statutes as “wage 
loss,” used to evaluate “permanent partial” disability (PPD).286 
Although there are many variations on the theme under state law, 
when a claimant has a compensable injury and has reached maximum 
medical improvement,287 an evaluation is made on how to return 
claimant to work. If the amount of future wages is the same as former 
work, there is no additional payment. However, when there is a 
differential, workers’ compensation coverage pays the difference.288  
 Application of an individualized system would better serve 
claimants than the current system. Please note that I differentiate 
among claimants and recipients or beneficiaries. I think that if the 
ADA/IPE evaluation were performed for appropriate DI applicants 
(mostly age 50 and younger), more valid claims would be paid at an 
early stage, relieving more claimants of high anxiety and financial 
stress. 
                                                            
 &" It is interesting that CATO proposes increased government intrusion. All 
DI recipients are recovering FICA taxes, are currently and fully insured, and 
arguably are merely collecting under a policy similar to LTD policies. 
 &# Gokhale, supra note 280. 
 &$ Id. 
 &% Maximum medical improvement (MMI) occurs when an injured employee 
reaches a state where his or her condition cannot be improved any further or when 
a treatment plateau in a person's healing process is reached. 
 && See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 908(c). (This section also addresses “scheduled 
injuries,” payments for loss of use of certain parts of the anatomy. At the state 
level, there is no majority rule, as they vary. In some states, there is a cap in terms 
of months of payment. In others, once a claimant is entitled to WC they are also 
entitled to SSA retirement benefits. See also PPD Benefits by State, MICH. STATE 
UNIV. (2008), 
http://hrlr.msu.edu/hr_executive_education/documents/State20PPD20Laws2008-
02.pdf  (providing a summary of state laws). 
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 If the same process were applied to the CDR process, it is 
reasonable that it would increase the 27% denial rate.289   
 The IPE would more accurately define the medical (i.e. RFC) and 
vocational profiles, so once cases are appealed a superior record 
would be developed.  Under current practice only a few claimants are 
receiving the VR services that many more are entitled to receive. 
 Development by SSA of the IPE/VR evaluation at the application 
stage has the potential, standing alone, to completely resolve the DI 
Trust Fund dilemma. However, extensive rulemaking is needed to 
restructure the existing system and it is expected that it will take 
several years to yield results. 
BB. Experience Rating. Experience rating is a process for 
determining insurance premiums based on the cost of an insurance 
pool’s past claims.290 An insurer calculates a firm’s insurance 
premium based on the likelihood, or risk, of the firm submitting a 
future claim, given its previous behavior.291 Many types of employer-
                                                            
 &' Id. 
 ' David C. Stapleton, Bending the Employment, Income, and Cost Curves for 
People with Disabilities 2 MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., No. 11- 01, 
(2011). 
 '  See Id. at 38-40. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 908(c) This section also addresses 
“scheduled injuries,” payments for loss of use of certain parts of the anatomy. At 
the state level, there is no majority rule, as they vary. In some states, there is a cap 
in terms of months of payment. In others, once a claimant is entitled to WC they 
are also entitled to SSA retirement benefits. See also PPD Benefits by State, supra 
note 290. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) identifies the 
following principles of risk management. Risk management should: 
• create value – resources expended to mitigate risk should be less 
than the consequence of inaction, or (as in value engineering), the gain 
should exceed the pain; 
• be an integral part of organizational processes; 
• be part of decision making process; 
• explicitly address uncertainty and assumptions; 
• be systematic and structured process; 
• be based on the best available information; 
• be tailorable; 
• take human factors into account; 
• be transparent and inclusive; 
• be dynamic, iterative and responsive to change; 
• be capable of continual improvement and enhancement; and 
• be continually or periodically re-assessed. 
Committee Draft of ISO 31000 Risk Management, 
http://www.nsai.ie/uploads/file/N047_Committee_Draft_of_ISO_31000.pdf  
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sponsored insurance use experience ratings to determine premiums, 
including state workers’ compensation (“WC”), unemployment 
insurance (“UI”), and private long-term disability insurance 
(“LTD”).292 
1. Mr. Stapleton and researchers Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C. 
Daly, and Philip R. de Jong address whether it is feasible to treat DI 
in the same manner as insurance companies rate employers in 
underwriting. 293 Mr. Morton does a thorough job of highlighting 
arguments for and against this proposal, and much of the discussion 
infra, comes from his paper.294 
2. Employers pay the same payroll tax rate on their employees’ 
earnings for DI, regardless of the rate at which their employees enroll 
in the program.295 According to the researchers, especially Mr. 
Stapleton, under the current system, employers have little incentive 
to make robust investments in preventative, accommodative, or 
rehabilitative services, because employees with disabilities can 
transition to DI without any additional cost to the employer.296 
However, under an experience rated system, employers whose 
employees enroll in DI at rates above the national average would pay 
a higher payroll tax rate, whereas firms whose employees enter the 
program at below average rates would pay a lower payroll tax rate.297  
3. According to the researchers and Mr. Morton, in theory, the 
experienced-rated payroll tax should incentivize employers to 
provide supported-work services, in order to reduce their employees’ 
enrollment rate in SSDI and subsequently lower their labor costs.298 
                                                            
 '  Stapleton, supra note 292.    
 '! Id. Insurance premium determination systems and methodologies vary by 
state. Workers’ compensation provides medical benefits and a partial wage 
replacement to insured workers whose impairment or condition stems from their 
employment. Unemployment insurance provides a partial wage replacement to 
insured workers who become involuntarily unemployed. See also Richard V. 
Burkhauser, Mary C. Daly & Philip R. de Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease: Lessons 
for United States Disability Policy (Univ. of Mich. Retirement Research Ctr., 
Working Paper 2008- 188, 2008), 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/Papers/pdf/wp188.pdf.   
 '" Morton, supra note 9. 
 '# Burkhauser, surpa note 295. 
 '$  Stapleton, supra note 292.  
 '% Id.  
 '& Id. 
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4. Mr. Stapleton states that another potential advantage of the 
experience rating option is its relative simplicity.299 Employers 
already report payroll tax data to the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), which the agency shares with SSA. Moreover, most 
employers are accustomed to the concept of experience rating 
stemming from their experience paying state WC and UI 
premiums.300 By compiling both payroll tax and beneficiary award 
data, SSA could conceivably initiate an experience rating system to 
the DI payroll tax “without imposing substantial new reporting 
requirements or administrative burdens on employers.”301  
5. The researchers admit that notwithstanding the potential for 
reduced enrollment in DI, implementing an experience rating system 
to the employer’s portion of the payroll tax may adversely affect 
some workers.302 For example, experience-rated payroll taxes could 
make employers hesitant to hire or retain workers ‘perceived to be a[] 
high risk for disability.’303 Employers may discriminate against older 
workers, people with chronic conditions such as diabetes, or 
individuals prone to at-risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol or substance 
abuse) in order to avoid paying a higher payroll tax rate on their 
employees’ earnings.304 To address this possibility, supporters of 
experience rating suggest implementing risk adjustments specific to 
factors such as age, occupation, and health status, as well as 
enforcing existing anti-discrimination laws.305 
6. In addition, experience rating could conceivably reduce the 
compensation or employment opportunities of low-wage workers. 
Some employers, subject to higher payroll tax rates, could shift the 
additional cost onto workers in the form of reduced take-home pay 
and benefits.  
7. Alternatively, employers, unable to shift additional labor costs 
onto their employees, may instead offset the higher payroll tax rate 
                                                            
 '' Id. 
! Id. 
! David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the 
United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options 15 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 17697, 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17697. 
!  Stapleton, supra note 292, at 3. 
!! Morton, supra note 9, at 40.  
!" Id. 
!# Id.  
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by hiring fewer workers in the future. Mr. Morton aptly notes that
employers may be unable to shift increased labor costs onto 
employees due to a lower bound restraint such as the minimum 
wage.306  Since many low-wage individuals typically work in 
professions with high rates of disability, they may be 
disproportionately affected by employer cost avoidance and therefore 
more likely to suffer financially as a result.307 Mr. Stapleton would 
offset the reduced compensation with an expansion of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) in order to bolster the after-tax income 
of low-wage workers.308  
8. Opponents of experience rating argue that workers adversely 
affected by employer cost avoidance could turn to []DI as a last 
resort, thereby increasing worker enrollment. . . .309  
9. Some critics of experience rating have expressed concern that 
while the system changes the incentives of employers with respect to 
program enrollment, it fails to address the incentives of workers to 
apply for DI.310 Some workers may apply for DI  because of 
economic circumstances such as unemployment or low wages.311 The 
CBO notes that “[a]lthough the initial determination process screens 
out most non-meritorious claimants, SSA may grant awards to some 
claimants on the margin of program entry who could potentially work 
but choose not to due to economic circumstances.”312 Under an 
experience rating system, the former employers of these new 
beneficiaries could have their payroll tax rate increased, even though 
the beneficiaries based their decision to apply for DI primarily on 
factors unrelated to health status or disability. As a result, these 
employers would be penalized twice for terminating a worker, insofar 
as their UI rate would increase, as well as their payroll tax rate for DI 
and Medicare. Given this scenario, opponents contend that 
experience rating the employer’s portion of the payroll tax does little 
                                                            
!$ Id.  
!% Id. 
!& Stapleton, supra note 292. 
!' Morton, supra note 9, at 40. 
! Id. 
! Id. at 40-41. Moral hazard refers to the tendency for individuals to engage 
in risky behavior when they are not fully exposed to the consequences of their 
actions. 
!  Id. at 40.  
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to address the moral hazard of workers applying to the program for 
reasons unrelated to health status or disability.313  
 As described, there is no basis to actually determine whether the 
Trust Funds would be affected by experience rating employers. It 
probably will cost time, effort and expensive start-up funding to 
initiate. I also find that the “cons” expressed by the CBO, whether 
predominant or not, make the proposal risky.314  
 Moreover, I find that risk management and experience rating is 
not “science.” I note the analogies to WC and LTD. I address LTD in 
more detail later, but the history of WC includes a litany of failure 
and all fifty states and the District of Columbia are served by 
guaranty funds to cover bankrupt WC insurers.315 For example, the 
Florida Workers' Compensation Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. 
(FWCIGA) provides a mechanism for the payment of covered 
claims, in the event of the insolvency of a member insurer.316 Dozens 
of carriers have become bankrupt. In fact the Florida Workers’ 
Compensation Find, itself became insolvent in 1999.317  Whether 
these failures were actually due to improvident underwriting or 
whether fraud or indolence was involved, Workers compensation is a 
bad analogy.318  
 In most states, employers are required to provide WC insurance 
coverage for their employees or post a bond.319 Some employers have 
to be sued for failure to obtain coverage. Although it is not a valid 
defense, many are unable to bear the increased costs, including the 
administrative expense and time involved.  
 This proposal would add another layer of bureaucracy. As many 
potential DI claimants are self-insured, the proposal does not include 
them. Even if a person who is self-insured may have a geographical 
or demographic advantage based on risk assessment factors, there is 
no way (or reason) to adjust for experience rating.320 
                                                            
!! Id. at 38.   
!" Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5. 
!# See FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INS. GUARANTY ASSOC., 
http://fwciga.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
!$  Id. 
!% Id.  
!& Id. 
!' Id. 
!   For example, someone living in Greenwich Connecticut has a better 
geographic risk factor than someone living in Appalachia. According to recent 
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 Given that legislation and rulemaking is required for this 
proposal, and given the controversy, to any degree of probability, it 
cannot be effectuated. 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 4: ADDRESS ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA. 
 
A. “Severe” 
 
 At step 2 of the sequential evaluation in an initial claim, a 
claimant must show a “medically determinable impairment” to be 
evaluated at the remaining steps.321 At present, almost any bald 
allegation of disability constitutes a “severe” impairment at step 2 of 
the sequential evaluation. This starts a costly and time consuming 
process that may include sending the claimant to a medical expert 
(ME) for a consultative examination (CE) and having that report 
examined by another ME.322 Even if the allegation of a severe 
impairment cannot be substantiated at the DDS level, the case may 
enter the appeals process where hundreds of hours of work may be 
entailed. 
 In Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme Court 
found that if a claimant is unable to prove a medically severe 
impairment, then the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits.323 
At Step Two of the sequential evaluation, as the claimant is “not 
disabled,” there is no reason to spend taxpayer and DI Fund money 
                                                            
statistics, claimants in certain counties in Appalachia and in the Delta regions of 
Mississippi, Arkansas and Louisiana have about 100 times higher incidences of 
disability. See Allen Flippen, Where Are the Hardest Places to Live in the U.S.? 
NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/upshot/where-are-the-
hardest-places-to-live-in-the-
us.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22
RI%3A11%22%7D&_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (last visited June 26, 2014), Please 
note that the incidence is ten times greater in Appalachia than in Oklahoma City or 
Philadelphia. The 10 lowest counties in the country, by this ranking, include a 
cluster of six in the Appalachian Mountains of eastern Kentucky (Breathitt, Clay, 
Jackson, Lee, Leslie and Magoffin), along with four others in various parts of the 
rural South: Humphreys County, Miss.; East Carroll Parish, La.; Jefferson County, 
Ga.; and Lee County, Ark. Moreover life expectancies in most of Appalachia are 
ten years less than in most of the rest of the U.S. 
!  See Johns, supra note 161. 
!   Id. 
! ! Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 180 (1987).  
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for a consultative evaluation or consider the claimant's vocational 
factors.324 The burden of proof is supposed to be on the claimant.325 
A claimant must produce medical evidence that shows that an 
inability to perform basic work activities, as required in most jobs. 
i.e. impediments to walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, 
pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; seeing, hearing, and 
speaking; understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple 
instructions; use of judgment, responding appropriately to 
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and dealing with 
changes in a routine work setting.326 If medical evidence does not 
support allegations about the medical profile, the file should be 
closed.327  
 It should be easy to profile which claims will fail to meet the 
“severe” standard. Statistics show that over eighty percent of 
genitourinary and neoplastic impairments prevail at the initial stage, 
while the rate drops to 26.3 percent for skin disorders and to about 
thirty percent for musculoskeletal diagnoses.328 Therefore, the range 
of variation in initial allowances among the body systems is roughly 
fifty-five percentage points.329 In general, the genitourinary and 
neoplastic body systems have the highest initial award rates, more 
than any other group by at least 20 percentage points.330 As a result, 
those two groups also have the lowest proportions of initial denials 
not appealed, final allowances, and final denials.331 Applicants with 
injuries and skin impairments appear most likely not to appeal an 
initial denial, with about thirty-one percent of the outcomes.332 
Musculoskeletal diagnoses have the highest proportion of final 
                                                            
! " Id. See also SSR 88-3c and SSR 85-28. 
! #  5 U.S.C. § 556(d).   The drafters of the APA used the term “burden of 
proof” to mean the burden of persuasion.  Director, OWCP, Department of Labor 
v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994). 
! $ See 20 C.F.R. 404.1569(a), Exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 
also SSR 96-8p, Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in 
Initial Claims. 
! % Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer, DICTIONARY OF 
OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (2010), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/INSD/08-
1621.pdf.  
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allowances, with about 34 percent of the outcomes, followed by skin 
disorders.333 In addition to injuries, however, musculoskeletal and 
skin impairments also exhibit the highest rates of final denials.334 
 In internal SSA rulings and instructions to staff, if the evidence 
“is not clearly established” by medical evidence, adjudication must 
continue through the sequential evaluation process.335 
 I argue that as practiced by the agency, the severity standard is 
too relaxed. If a claimant is able to work the full range of heavy 
work, this generally is sufficient for a finding of “not disabled.”336 As 
a matter of convenience at step two at the initial level, almost every 
claim is reviewed for matters that are irrelevant at that level, and can 
be appealed to the hearings level, and under the current law has to be 
heard.337 This is a waste of energy and resources. In FY2011, the unit 
cost of adjudicating a disability hearing was $2,752.00, whereas the 
unit cost of processing an initial disability claim was $1,058.44.338 
The burden of proof is supposed to be on the claimant, and if heavy 
work can be performed, and there is no non-exertional overlay, it is 
reasonable to stop the process at Step Two in the sequential 
evaluation and place the obligation of going forward on the 
claimant.339  
 Statistics will show that misapplication of Bowen v. Yuckert 
unnecessarily bogs the adjudication system. In some states anyone 
                                                            
!!! Id. This probably a function of the duration requirement as the conditions 
could be “severe” if they were to last 12 consecutive months to meet the durational 
aspect.  
!!" Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer, supra note 329.  
!!# Id.  
An applicant is denied at step 2 if his or her impairment(s) is considered not 
severe. DI 24505.001 Individual Must Have a Medically Determinable Severe 
Impairment, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2012), 
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424505001. Applicants are also denied 
if their impairments fail the duration test; that is, if the impairment (1) is not 
expected to result in death, and (2) has neither lasted 12 months nor is expected to 
last for a continuous period of 12 months. The duration test is typically invoked at 
step 2, but may also be invoked at step 3, 4, or 5. 
!!$ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2015). 
!!% Id. 
!!& Aspects of Disability 
Decision Making: Data and Materials, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD.  (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf. 
!!' 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A) (2015). 
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who receives state benefits, i.e. public assistance or unemployment, 
even if not related to disability, must apply to SSA to receive the state 
benefits.340 An applicant should be able to prove at least a medically 
determinable impairment as a condition precedent to proceed to a 
hearing. There is no reason the DDS cannot be provided a clear 
indication through a neutral interrogatory from the claimant’s treating 
sources soon after the claim is filed.341 
 At the time of application, claimants should be informed that 
their chances of success improve with representation, and that they 
may use services under the WIOA and the Wagner-Peyser Act. It 
may be that after an IPE is developed a claimant is rejected for VR, 
that fact will presume that the claimant is “disabled.”  
 In the current setting, to promote judicial economy, absent further 
legislation or rulemaking, if a case has a questionable medically 
determinable impairment, at the hearings level, before unnecessary 
                                                            
!" This is why there are a disproportionate number of claims in states that 
force SSI claims and explains why the probability for awards in these states should 
be less likely. For states, it is generally financially advantageous for adults and 
children with disabilities to transfer from such programs as Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) to SSI. States gain because the federal government 
pays for the SSI benefit, and states can then use the TANF savings for other 
purposes. The families gain because the SSI benefits they acquire are greater than 
the TANF benefits they lose. The payoff to states from transferring welfare 
recipients to SSI was substantially increased when Congress replaced AFDC with 
TANF in 1996. States retained less than half of any savings achieved through such 
transfers under AFDC, but they retain all of the savings under TANF. Also, the 
work participation requirements under TANF have obligated states to address the 
work support needs of adults with disabilities who remain in TANF, and states can 
avoid these costs if adults have disabilities that satisfy SSI eligibility requirements. 
The incentive for TANF recipients to apply for SSI has increased over time as 
inflation has caused real TANF benefits to fall relative to payments received by SSI 
recipients. Steve Wamhoff and Michael Wiseman, The TANF/SSI Connection, U.S. 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF POLICY, 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n4/v66n4p21.html.  In addition, five states 
enacted employer temporary disability insurance (“TDI”) mandates prior to the first 
year of data included in this analysis: California (1946), Hawaii (1969), New Jersey 
(1948), New York (1949), and Rhode Island (1942). Norma B. Coe et al. supra.  
According to Coe, et al, holding all else constant, the five states that mandate 
employer TDI should have lower application rates. 
!"  SSA can use a “report of contact” with the treating sources through 
telephone and even social media within the first 10 days. Claimants should be 
given the opportunity to get statements from their treating sources and should be 
provided SSA DI forms appropriate to their alleged impairments.   
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development work is committed to the claim, an administrative law 
judge should be able to issue an order to show cause whether one 
exists. 
 
B. Medical Vocational Guidelines 
 
 As stated above, the DOT was last updated in 1991.342 Since the 
grids are based on them, they are most probably flawed.  Bills in both 
the House and Senate would require the Commissioner to proscribe 
rules and regulations to update the medical-vocational guidelines, 
appendix 2 to the Regulations.343  This has been discussed for years. 
In July 2012, the DOL Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) contracted 
with SSA to test the viability of using the DOL BLS’ National 
Compensation Survey (NCS) to collect updated occupational data.344  
According to SSA, the agency plans to conduct ongoing testing and 
analysis of its data collection process in FY2013 and FY2014, with 
the expectation of implementing the new OIS starting in FY2016.345 
 In November 2005, SSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) that proposed to increase the age categories for older 
insured workers by two years.346 However, after receiving adverse 
comments, SSA withdrew the NPRM in May, 2009.347 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the effects of 
increasing the 45-49 and 50-54 age ranges by two years to 47-51 and 
52-56 and making 57 to FRA the new maximum range, thereby 
eliminating the 45, 46, and 60 and older categories.348 According to 
CBO, implementing this policy option in 2013 would have decreased 
the number of SSDI beneficiaries by 50,000 or 0.5% in 2022, as well 
as reduced program expenditures by $1.0 billion in that year.349 
Adjusting the age categories for vocational factors would likely 
encourage older insured workers to seek out other potential income 
supports. According to the CBO, whereas workers aged 62 to FRA 
                                                            
!"  See supra note 190.  
!"! The GRIDD Act of 2015, S.1194, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).  
!"" Occupational Information System Project, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.., 
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html. 
!"# Id.  
!"$ Age as a Factor in Evaluating Disability, 70 Federal Reg. 67104 (2005). 
!"% 74 Federal Reg. 21563 (2009). 
!"& Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5. See also Morton, supra, note 9, at 23-24. 
!"'  Publ’n No. 4207, supra note, at 18. 
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could apply for early retirement benefits, workers with a recent 
attachment to the labor force may choose to apply for other work-
related supports such as state workers’ compensation, private 
disability insurance, or unemployment insurance.350  
 Apparently, SSA does not have studies that support a need to 
increase the age by two years. Critics note that although the worklife 
and life expectancies of all workers are on the rise, those in the lower 
income occupations have actually decreased worklife and life 
expectancies.351  
 I argue that the grids should not be applied to younger 
individuals. The regulations recognize that age is a positive factor for 
claimants who are under age 45 and is usually not a significant factor 
in limiting an individual's ability to make a vocational adjustment, 
even an adjustment to unskilled sedentary work, and even where the 
individual is illiterate or unable to communicate in English.352 A 
younger individual who meets “disabled” criteria would have met or 
equaled a listed impairment at step 3 of the sequential evaluation, 
before application of the grids.353 Some Circuit Courts provide a 
                                                            
!# Mr. Morton points out that low-income claimants would most likely apply 
for SSI and Medicaid in response to the adjustment in the age categories. Morton, 
supra  note 9, at 24.   
!# See E.G., Paul Krugman, Expanding Social Security, NEW YORK TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/opinion/krugman-expanding-social-
security.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). (“Those with lower incomes and less 
education have, at best, seen hardly any rise in life expectancy at age 65; in fact, 
those with less education have seen their life expectancy decline.”).  See also The 
Life Expectancy Zombie, NEW YORK TIMES 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/the-life-expectancy-zombie/?_r=0 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013). 
!#   See Appendix 2 to the Regulations. 
!#! 20 C.F.R. 404.1545(5).  How we will use our residual functional capacity 
assessment. (i) We will first use our residual functional capacity assessment at step 
four of the sequential evaluation process to decide if you can do your past relevant 
work. See §§ 404.1520(f) and 404.1560(b)) 
(ii) If we find that you cannot do your past relevant work, you do not have any 
past relevant work, or if we use the procedures in § 404.1520(h) and § 404.1562 
does not apply, we will use the same assessment of your residual functional 
capacity at step five of the sequential evaluation process to decide if you can adjust 
to any other work that exists in the national economy. See §§ 404.1520(g) and 
404.1566. At this step, we will not use our assessment of your residual functional 
capacity alone to decide if you are disabled. We will use the guidelines in §§ 
404.1560 through 404.1569a, and consider our residual functional capacity 
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defacto basis for equaling the record.354 Although some believe that a 
claimant is “disabled” if (s)he cannot perform a full range of 
sedentary work. Actually, if a claimant does not, in fact, have the 
residual functional capacity for a full range of sedentary work, the 
case must be evaluated within the framework of the vocational 
rules.355 “The functional restrictions which limit the claimant to less 
than the full range of sedentary work must be specified.356 It must 
then be determined whether, considering all of the functional 
limitations, a "significant number" of sedentary jobs which the 
claimant can perform exists in the national economy.357 Evaluation 
using the grids, whether or not as a “framework” for decision 
making, is a mere formality for younger individuals. 
 Moreover, the evaluation should be more individualized. 
Although there is no DI equivalent, for example, SSA administers a 
Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS), which lets a recipient pay for 
items or services needed to achieve a specific work goal.358 This is 
similar to the WIOA VR process when an equivalent to an IPE is 
developed.359 Again, it may be that after an IPE is developed a 
claimant is rejected for VR, that fact will force the adjudicator to 
presume that the claimant is “disabled.”360 
                                                            
assessment together with the information about your vocational background to 
make our disability determination or decision. 
!#" See, e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing 
that it was improbable that claimant’s physicians would have prescribed drugs and 
other treatment for her if they had believed that she was faking her pain and noting 
that “[s]uch an inference would amount to an accusation that the medical workers 
who treated [the claimant] were behaving unprofessionally”).  More recently, in 
Goins v. Colvin, 764 F. 3d 677  (7th Cir.2014), he again attacked the decision for 
undermining subjective complains of several impairments competent to produce 
disability.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner opinion takes aim at denial of 
disability benefits; is it a 7th Circuit trend?, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_opinion_takes_aim_at_denial_of_
disability_benefits_is_it_a_7th_circu. 
!## SSR 86-8: Titles II and XVI: The Sequential Evaluation Process, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/op_home/rulings/di/01/ssr86-08-di-
01.html. 
!#$ Id. 
!#% Id. 
!#& Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/pass.htm.  
!#' See WIOA Overview, supra, note 218. 
!$ Id.  
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 On the other hand, development of the IPE is more defined that 
the current “vocational profile” needed to establish past relevant 
work and other job duty evidence at step 5 of the adult listing.361 This 
would eliminate the need to use the grid as a framework for decision 
making.  
 At present, at hearing, if a claimant has a non-exertional 
impairment, a vocational expert is required in most circuits. 
 As to those closely approaching advanced age and older, the issue 
is usually transferability. Perhaps the ADA should be incorporated 
into decision making. If an IPE were developed, educational, 
psychological, psychiatric, vocational, personal, social and medical 
factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation needs would be 
individualized.  
 
C. “Double Dip” 
 
 Bills in both the House and Senate would have substantial gainful 
activity within a month after an individual is paid, or determined to 
be eligible for, unemployment compensation.362 
 A claimant for unemployment must swear under oath that (s)he is 
ready willing and able to work, and work search is required. A 
claimant for DI must swear that (s)he is unable to perform any 
gainful activities.363 These concepts are conflicted.  
 
D. MIRS 
 
 SSA has investigated whether the MIRS standard used in CDRs, 
which requires that SSA show medical improvement before benefits 
can be terminated, should be retained.364 The IG determined that if 
SSA used the Initial Disability Standard, rather than MIRS during a 
                                                            
!$ Id. 
!$  Social Security Disability Insurance and Unemployment Benefits Double 
Dip Elimination Act, S. 499, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); Social Security Disability 
Insurance and Unemployment Benefits Double Dip Elimination Act, H.R. 918, 
114th  Cong. (2015-2016). 
!$! Id.  
!$" 20 C.F.R. 404.1594. See Statement of Inspector Gen. O’Carroll Jr., supra 
note 112. See also The Medical Improvement Review Standard During Continuing 
Disability Reviews, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 2014), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-01-13-23065.pdf.  The 
investigation found numerous coding mistakes that also should be resolved. Id.   
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CDR, about $269 million less in benefits would be due until the next 
CDR due date to about 4,000 adult beneficiaries who would not be 
disabled.365 
 A major problem with this suggestion is that it has been tried 
unsuccessfully. At the onset of the Reagan Administration, about one 
million beneficiaries were subject to a three-year CDR review, and 
between March 1981 and early 1984, federal-funded state Disability 
Determination Services agencies terminated the benefits of almost 
500,000 disabled Americans, including tens of thousands of 
beneficiaries with severe mental impairments. Twenty-nine states 
refused to follow SSA’s instructions for termination of benefits; 
federal courts were clogged with appeals; 200 federal courts across 
the country threatened the government with contempt of court 
citations for refusing to pay benefits when ordered. 
 Litigation challenging the CDR policy was instituted across the 
county, including more than 12,000 individual appeals of 
terminations and forty class actions. Many courts ordered SSA to 
apply a medical improvement standard before terminating disability 
benefits and one-half of the states refused to follow SSA’s new 
procedures and criteria. By April 1984, the Administration finally 
announced a nationwide moratorium on CDRs. Ultimately Congress 
enacted the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (DBRA) to 
clarify eligibility and to limit terminations to cases where the agency 
could show that the beneficiary’s medical condition had improved.366 
 
E. Increase of the Currently Insured Requirement 
 
 A recency-of-work test is satisfied if the worker has earned at 
least twenty credits during a 40-quarter period that ends with the 
quarter in which the waiting period begins.367  
 A special test for younger workers provides an alternative. A 
worker who is under a disability which began before the quarter of 
attainment of age thirty-one satisfies the “current” requirement if 
                                                            
!$# Id.   
!$$ Katharine P. Collins and Anne Erfle, Social Security Disability Benefits 
Reform Act of 1984: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 48 SOC. SEC. 
BULLETIN 4 (1985), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n4/v48n4p5.pdf. 
!$% Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Worker 
Experience, Actuarial Study No. 118, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as118/DI-WrkerExper_Body.html#wp1237389.  
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credits were earned for at least one-half of the quarters during the 
period beginning with the quarter after the quarter the worker 
attained age twenty-one, and ending with the quarter in which the 
disability began.368 If this period contains twelve or fewer quarters—
that is, if the disability begins in the quarter the worker attains age 
twenty-four or earlier—then a minimum of six credits must be earned 
in the twelve-quarter period ending with the quarter in which the 
disability began.369 
 CBO recently estimated the impact of increasing the recency-of-
work requirement on beneficiary enrollment.370 The agency projected 
that requiring disability claimants to have worked four of the past six 
years (instead of five of the past ten) starting in 2013 would have 
reduced the number of SSDI beneficiaries by 4% in 2022, as well as 
decreased program outlays by $8.0 billion in that year.371 
 According to Mr. Morton, the stricter recency-of-work 
requirement would likely affect individuals with intermittent work 
histories, specifically workers with prolonged and sustained bouts of 
absence from covered employment due to unemployment or 
withdrawal from the labor force.372  A recent study found that while 
men report leaving the labor force primarily because of disability, 
women typically report leaving the labor force to care for someone in 
their household.373 Consequently, the morestringent recency-of-work 
requirement may disproportionately affect women who drop out of 
the labor force to act as caregivers. 
 I find that any gains to the DI Fund because of a failure to meet 
the currently insured requirement will most probably be lost to SSI 
                                                            
!$& Id.  
!$' Id.  
!% Options For Reducing the Deficit: 2014-2013, Mandatory Spending, 
Function 650- Social Security, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44755.  
!% Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5, at 18; Morton, supra note 9, at 23.  
!%  Morton, supra note 9.  
!%! Julie L. Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts & Fernando Rios-Avila, A Closer 
Look at Nonparticipants During and After the Great Recession 6 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank, Working Paper 2012-10, 2012), 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/12_10.cfm.  
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and the general funds. Moreover, public policy should not 
discriminate against caregivers.374  
 
V. RECOMMENDATION FIVE: REDUCE FRAUD 
 
A. In General 
 
 Although accusations of widespread fraud are grossly 
exaggerated, Congress should eliminate the taint. Recently, the SSA 
IG reported that over a ten-year period, SSA overpaid recipients of 
about seventeen billion dollars.375 The IG bases this estimate on a 
sampling of both DI and SSI claims, so the amount is substantially 
less for the DI program.376 SSA recovered about $8.1 billion of the 
$16.8 billion in overpayments it assessed and prevented about $8 
billion in overpayments.377 Considering in the amounts paid into the 
system, the differences are not as large as depicted in the headlines. 
 Some of the reasons the IG found are: 
 
a. Work activity or income: Cessation if the work activity 
constitutes SGA.378 
 
b. Payment issued after death: An individual’s benefits stop with 
death.379 
 
c. Imprisonment or fugitive status: The Social Security Act 
prohibits the payment of DI to recipients convicted and incarcerated 
                                                            
!%" See Sarah E. Hoffman, Falling Through the Cracks: How the 20/40 Rule 
Discriminates Against Women Seeking Social Security Disability Insurance 
Benefits and What Congress Can Do About It, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 621, (2009). 
 
!%# Overpayments in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Program – 
a Ten Year Study, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.  (Jun. 
2015)[hereinafter Overpayments], http://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-
investigations/audit-reports/A-01-14-24114;  See also Report: Social Security 
Overpaid Disability Benefits by $17B, NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/06/05/us/politics/ap-us-social-security-
overpayments.html.  
!%$ Id.  
!%% Id. 
!%& Id. 
!%' Id. 
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for a period of more than 30 days in a jail, prison, or other penal or 
correctional facility; (2) DI benefits to beneficiaries having certain 
unsatisfied warrants.380 
 
d. Medical improvement: Through CDR: if the individual is no 
longer disabled, he/she may appeal and continue to receive benefits 
during the appeal process. If the appeal affirms the disability ceased, 
SSA assesses an overpayment for the amount of benefits paid during 
the appeal process.381 
 
e. Duplicate benefit payment: Payment issued more than once for 
the same month. For example, an individual receiving a replacement 
check after reporting not receiving the original check and then 
cashing both checks.382 
 
f.  Incorrect payment computations: The payment amount was 
based on incorrect information.383 
 
g. Improperly entitled to benefits: Under certain circumstances, 
SSA may reopen a prior allowance decision and change it to a denial, 
such as when a disability beneficiary returns to work and performs 
SGA within a few months from the date the disability began.384 
 
h.  Not cooperative: SSA may suspend an individual’s payment 
for failure to provide the Agency pertinent information.385 
 
i. Married: Entitlement to certain DI benefits (i.e. widow or 
widower) depend on the beneficiary being unmarried.386  
                                                            
!& Id.  Social Security Act, §§ 202(x)(1)(A)(i), (iv)-(v) & (B)(iii)-(iv); Social 
Security Act1611(e)(1)(A) & 1611(e)(4); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(x)(1)(A)(i), (iv)-(v) & 
(B)(iii)-(iv); 1382(e)(1)(A) & 1382(e)(4). See Social Security Inspector General 
Report: Implementation of Phase I of the Martinez Settlement Agreement, OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Feb. 2011), 
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/news-releases/social-security-inspector-general-
report-implementation-phase-i-martinez.   
!& Overpayments, supra note 379.  
!&  Id.  
!&! Id.  
!&" Id.  
!&# Id.  
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j. Receiving Multiple Benefits: Dual entitlement exists when a 
beneficiary is entitled to more than one benefit at the same time. For 
example, a beneficiary may be entitled to retirement benefits on his 
or her own earnings record and to spouse’s benefits on another 
person’s earnings record. Although a beneficiary may be 
simultaneously entitled to more than one benefit, the total benefit 
may not be greater than the highest single benefit amount to which he 
or she is entitled. Generally, SSA calculates the amounts due and 
combines the benefits into one monthly payment.387 
 
k. Needed a representative payee: SSA assigns a representative 
payee to an individual when the Agency determines the individual is 
incapable of handling his/her own benefits. SSA may suspend 
payment while establishing or changing a representative payee, and 
an overpayment may occur to beneficiaries for the same month.388 
 
 Meanwhile, whereas the SSA database includes approximately 
6.5 million individuals who would be age 112 or older, other sources 
list only 35 people aged 112 or older in the world as of October. 
2013.389 Of course, none of these discrepancies has anything to do 
with disability fraud, but there is some question whether this is fraud 
or error and if it is error it is by the same organization administering 
DI.  
 The IG has performed a valuable service,390 but I find that the 
emphasis does not account for many DI recipients who work at SGA 
                                                            
!&$ Id.  
!&% Overpayments, supra note 379. 
!&& Id. 
!&' Sean Williams, Social Security Fraud: The Mind-Numbing Reason the SSA 
Is Being Cheated Out of Billions, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jun.13, 2015), 
http://www.fool.com/retirement/general/2015/06/13/social-security-fraud-the-
mind-numbing-reason-the.aspx. (“Per the OIG, some 1.4 million beneficiaries had 
death notes input into their records, but an official date of death had not been 
recorded, thus signaling, … that these individuals were still alive. Another 410,000 
individuals had their payments terminated and death dates added, but the official 
death date information was not passed on . . . .”). 
 
!' Most of these examples are probably not fraud in the criminal sense, but are 
errors. Most of the “mistakes” would probably be covered in private industry by 
“error and omission” insurance coverage.  
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but fail to report. An underground economy is comprised of people 
who do not report income to SSA let alone to IRS. Some sources 
allege that the “shadow economy” in this country yields as much as 
10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).391 The same sources allege 
that the shadow economy doubled from 4 % of GDP in 1970 to 9 % 
in 2000.392 
 Other sources think the “tax gap” is much higher.393 Forensic 
economists estimated that 18%- 19 % of income nationwide is not 
reported to the IRS.394 “The estimated $2 trillion of unreported 
income gives rise to an annual tax gap of $450-500 billion.”395 
 A “new” underground economy may entail: 
 
 …a lot of people doing honest work, such as freelancers and 
consultants who used to be full-time professionals, computer-repair 
people laid off from corporate IT departments, home remodelers 
benefiting from a revived housing sector, people running eBay 
business, and retirees earning a few extra bucks by running errands 
for busy parents.396 
                                                            
!' Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues30/;\ See also Joshua Zumbrun, 
More Americans Work in the Underground Economy,  BlOOMBERG NEWS,  (Mar. 
28, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-03-28/more-americans-
work-in-the-underground-economy). 
!'  Id. 
!'! Richard Cebula and Edgar Feige, America’s unreported economy: 
measuring the size, growth and determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S., 57 
CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 265-85 (2012), 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2011-1.pdf. 
!'" Id. 
!'#  Id. 
!'$ Rick Newman, The New Underground Economy: More people than ever 
may be working off-the-books--and spending freely, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD 
REPORT (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-
newman/2013/03/18/the-new-underground-economy.According to Newman, 
economists estimate the size of the underground economy at somewhere between 
8%-14% of total GDP, “which could amount to as much as $2 trillion worth of 
economic activity. Authorities in California say off-the-books transactions cost the 
state $6.5 billion in lost tax revenue every year.” “If the trend is similar throughout 
the U.S. economy, that would amount to roughly $50 billion in lost tax revenue for 
all 50 states combined, plus an even bigger chunk that Washington fails to collect.” 
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 If the estimates are correct and FICA taxes were received, and if 
all recipients currently working off the books were accountable, there 
would be no threat to default of the DI Trust Fund. 
 Congress has noted that SSA bars adjudicators from researching 
whether some claimants have opened themselves for investigation by 
postings in social media.397 Most of the complaints come from 
administrative law judges, and some have been discussed at 
Congressional hearings.398   
 I take the position that the agency has a duty to perform an 
investigation, “scouting,”399 where there is good cause to do so. 
When the DO collects medical and vocational information to create a 
claim file, it should ask questions about daily activities and social 
media is prevalent. If there is probable cause to investigate further, 
referrals should be made to the IG. Perhaps the DDS should also 
perform this function. However, I also take the position that this 
function should be performed by investigators and not administrative 
law judges.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) states that 
“[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative 
or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a 
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision.”400 
 I also recommend that Congress expand qui tam to permit suits to 
collect unpaid FICA taxes (as well as income taxes) and benefit the 
SSA Trust Funds against employers who knowingly pay workers 
“under the table.” Many unsuspecting workers discover when they 
become injured that they have no DI benefits. 
 These suggestions will not immediately restore the DI Trust Fund 
to solvency, but may mitigate significant losses. 
 
 
                                                            
!'% See, e. g., Congress, Serial No. 113-72 (Nov. 19, 2013)  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86479/html/CHRG-
113hhrg86479.htm.  
!'& Id. 
!'' SSA DO employees investigate.  At one time SSA early retirement placed 
restrictions on working and employees would report after an investigation. The 
underlying law has changed and scouting is no longer performed.  
" 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 
237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et. seq.). 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 
701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562. 
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B. Bar LTD Carriers from Laying Off Exposure to the DI Trust 
Fund 
 
 As I have stated, some LTD carriers attempt to offset their 
exposure by requiring insureds to apply for DI. In 2009 the New York 
Times reported that disability insurers were compelling claimants to 
apply for Social Security even when they did not qualify, and were 
cutting off insurance checks if the claimants failed to do so.401 In 
response to a “qui tam” (whistleblower) lawsuit, Unum, one of the 
largest disability insurers, and Cigna stated in court filings that 
insurers may send ineligible persons to SSA to file claims, noting the 
agency “has an open-door policy.402 All comers are welcome.”403 
This bogs the system, and according to the qui tam complaints, leads 
to claimants wrongfully losing their LTD.404 
 The reason claimants are jeopardized is because the LTD 
standard in the qui tam cases requires the insured to prove an 
inability to work in one’s “own occupation,” not an SSA/DI inability 
to perform SGA, which is a far more restrictive test.405  Most DI 
claimants who receive LTD are in better financial status than most 
other beneficiaries.406 Processing these claims affects claims of 
others, mostly without income while waiting for “months and years, 
who in many cases are much worse off.” 407After an investigation, 
Senator Charles Grassley (R. IA.) wrote a letter to SSA 
recommending the following: 
  
                                                            
" Collette Mattzie, The Disability Mess, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 2009), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/the-disability-mess/comment-
page-4/?_r=0.   
"  Although a jury returned a verdict against the LTD companies, it was 
remanded on appeal by the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals. United States ex rel. 
Loughren v. Unum Group, 613 F.3d 300 (1st Cir. 2010).  
"! Mattzie, supra note 405.   
"" See also Mary Williams Walsh, Insurers Faulted as Overloading Social 
Security, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (April 1, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/business/01disabled.html. 
"# Press Release, Grassley works to strengthen Social Security disability 
program: Senator seeks agency response to backlog caused by insurance 
community (May 27, 2009), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley-works-strengthen-social-security-disability-program.  
"$ Id.  
"% Quoted from Ken Nabali, former SSA Associate Commissioner, Id.  
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(1) Require that individuals applying for SSA benefits disclose 
whether or not they have private or other non-SSA disability 
coverage or benefits at the time they file their SSDI or Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) application;408 
 
(2) Require SSDI and SSI applicants and claimant representatives 
to attest to the accuracy and truthfulness of SSDI or SSI claim 
information; and409  
 
(3) Implement information sharing arrangements with private 
insurers and other non-SSA disability programs to exchange 
information regarding the status or disposition of disability claims.410 
 
He also asked the Social Security Administration and the Federal 
Trade Commission for status reports on their evaluation of private 
insurance practices in this area.411 A diligent search yields no 
response. 
 Mr. Morton notes that as of March 2012, 39% of all workers in 
private industry had access to short-term disability insurance, 
whereas 33% had access to long-term LTD.412 Short-term private 
disability insurance (PDI) typically lasts a fixed number of weeks or 
months, whereas LTD insurance can last anywhere from a year to 
FRA.413  Compared with other forms of employer-care, PDI is 
relatively inexpensive.414 In addition, employers can partially offset 
the cost of PDI by requiring employees to contribute to the plan.415 
                                                            
"& Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator for Iowa, to Hon. Michel 
Astrue, Commn’r Soc. Sec. Admin. (Mar. 24, 2008), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-strengthen-
social-security-disability-program. 
"' Id.  
" Id.  
" Id.   
"  Morton, supra note 9.  
"! In March 2012, the median duration of benefit receipt on short-term PDI 
for all workers in private industry was Employee Benefits Survey, Short-Term 
Disability Plans: Duration of Benefits, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, Table 25 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/private/table35a.htm.  
"" In December 2012, employee health insurance cost employers in private 
industry $2.23 per-hour worked, whereas employee short-term disability insurance 
cost $0.05 and long-term disability insurance cost $0.04 per-hour worked. See 
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 Although the future is uncertain, the current trend appears away 
from traditional employer-employee relationships to self-
employment and use of independent contractors, and these plans do 
not include them. 
 The insurance industry has advocated that Congress should 
promote employer sponsored PDI “to reduce the growth in DI 
rolls.”416 Employer-sponsored PDI plans have the potential to reduce 
the incidence of DI benefit receipt, inasmuch as they provide 
employment support services soon after the onset of disability when 
the likelihood of recovery is highest. Proponents argue that by 
intervening with robust supported-work services early in the 
disability process, PDI and LTD may keep disabled workers attached 
to the labor force and therefore less likely to apply for DI.417 
 Mr. Morton reports that the promotion of employer-sponsored 
PDI could come about in either one of two ways: (1) encouragement 
through incentives or (2) a government mandate.”418 Under the 
former option, the federal government would offer employers 
financial incentives to provide PDI for their employees. For example, 
if the federal government adopted an experience rating system to the 
employer’s portion of the DI and Medicare payroll tax, SSA could 
further lower the payroll tax rate of employers who purchase PDI and 
LTD and whose insurance agents coordinate with SSA officials 
(gatekeepers) to manage disability cases in a cost-effective manner. 
                                                            
Economic News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 5: 
Private Industry, by Major Occupational Group and Bargaining Status (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t05.htm.  
"#  In March 2012, 19% of short-term PDI plans sponsored by employers in 
private industry required employee 
contributions, whereas 8% of long-term PDI plans had such a requirement. See 
Employee Benefits Survey: Nat’l Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in the 
U.S., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Tables Organized by 
Benefit (Mar. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/ 2012/benefits.htm#life. 
 
"$  David H. Autor & Mark Duggan, Supporting Work: A Proposal for 
Modernizing the U.S. Disability Insurance System, THE CTR. FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS and THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/12/disability-insurance-autor 
"% See Coe et al., supra note 86. The authors found that state-mandated 
temporary disability insurance (TDI) has a small negative effect on overall SDI 
applications.  
418 Morton, supra note 9. 
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419Alternatively, the federal government could award subsidies or tax 
credits to firms that provide PDI and LTD.420 
 Under the latter option, the federal government would require all 
employers to provide PDI for their employees. To enforce the 
mandate, employers who fail to provide PDI would likely face 
financial penalties for their non-compliance. In 2010, only New 
Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico required employers to 
provide some form of short-term PDI—known as temporary 
disability insurance (TDI)—or contribute to a state-operated fund.421 
Employer-mandated PDI, however, has become an increasingly 
popular approach to finance disability insurance in many European 
countries.  
 Mr. Morton reports that researchers David H. Autor and Mark 
Duggan have proposed requiring all employers to provide medium-
term PDI, through which workers with disabilities would receive 
rehabilitation services, workplace accommodation, and a partial wage 
replacement for two years.422 Plans under this proposal would be 
purchased on the existing PDI market, and employers would be 
permitted to require employees to contribute up to 40% of the cost of 
their coverage.423 Following the exhaustion of employer-sponsored 
PDI, SSA would transition beneficiaries who still lack the ability to 
engage in SGA onto SSDI.424 Workers with extremely severe or 
terminal disabilities would be exempt from the two-year PDI 
requirement and would instead be immediately fast-tracked onto 
DI.425 
                                                            
"'  Autor, supra note 420 at, 39 n.228 (c). 
"   Id. at 42, n.249 (c). 
"   Id. at n.250 (“TDI typically provides partial compensation due to non-
occupational disability for approximately 26 to 52 weeks. For more information, 
see Social Security Administration, No. 13-11758, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 46 (Jul. 
1997), http://www.SSA.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/).  
"   Id. at n.252 (citing Autor, supra note 420). 
" ! Id., n.253 (“rated for firms with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees, 
whereas smaller firms would have their premiums determined based on 
differentiated rates by industry.”) 
" " Morton, supra note 9. 
" #Autor,supra note 420,  at  n.254 “protect employers from the so-called 
“double indemnity” of paying higher experienced-rated premiums for both UI and 
PDI, unemployed workers would be unable to claim both UI and PDI benefits 
simultaneously.”) 
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 These are interesting proposals, but as with many of the others, it 
will take years for Congressional action, regulation, and 
implementation, and therefore they are not an immediate resolution 
to DI Trust Fund default. Several LTD carries and their lobbyists 
have been arguing for privatization of the entire system, and/or 
contracting evaluation from DDS to private companies.426 
 In looking at whether state mandated LTD (or PDI) in New 
Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have reduced rates for 
applications and awards in those states, I find no valid studies to 
substantiate the claim that private insurance generates savings. As a 
matter of fact, the SSA OIG has identified three of the four as states 
where systematic fraud on the DI system has occurred.427   
                                                            
" $ Id at 16. 
" % See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Disability-Fraud Probe Leads to Arrests in 
Puerto Rico: Social Security Benefits May Have Been Improperly Obtained, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug.21, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323665504579026583651700434
;  
William K. Rashbaum & Jamed C. McKinley Jr., Charges for 106 in Huge 
Fraud Over Disability, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/retired-new-york-officers-and-
firefighters-charged-in-social-security-scheme.html?hpw&rref=nyregion&_r=1.  
Scores of former police officers and firefighters were arrested on 
Tuesday and brought in handcuffs to State Supreme Court in 
Manhattan, where they were arraigned before Acting Justice 
Daniel Fitzgerald on charges of grand larceny. They are accused 
of collecting between $30,000 and $50,000 a year. 
Many of the 72 city police officers and eight firefighters named 
in the 205-count indictment had blamed the Sept. 11 attacks for 
what they described as mental problems: post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anxiety and severe depression. 
See also Shayna Jacobs, More than 50 people plead guilty in massive Social 
Security disability scam, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Jun. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/50-admit-participating-
disability-scam-article-1.1820605 (Apparently, the recipients also had taken 
disability pensions, and had received awards from the September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund (VCF)); Message from Special Master Sheila Birnbaum 
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.vcf.gov/blogprogstatsapr2015.html (“VCF has 
made loss determinations of more than $1 billion. As of March 31, 2015, the VCF 
has approved 10,549 eligibility claims and rendered 4,415 loss decisions, totaling 
$1,058,398,144.”); Wendy Floering, The September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund of 2001: A Better Alternative to Litigation? 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. 
L.JUDGES (2002) http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol22/iss1/6. Please 
note that my office, DOL OALJ, heard some of these cases.  
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 Moreover, if the allegations regarding LTD carriers in the qui tam 
actions are correct, the DI trust Fund has been losing far more than 
the fraud from Puerto Rico and the post 9/11 DI fraud.  The LTD 
losses as alleged may be continually perpetrated unless action is 
taken to mitigate them. 
 I recommend that to protect claimants from potential fraud, to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety, and to promote integrity, DI 
benefits should not be offset against LTD policies. Similarly, the 
Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) requires all claimants 
to apply for SSDI benefits. This requirement can lead to abuse and 
should be eliminated. 428 
 
C. Privacy Act 
 
 Our government is supposed to be open. SSA, however, has 
closed DI hearings and exhibit files are not public because the agency 
is overly concerned with the Privacy Act of 1974.429 SSA does not 
consider its appeals process to be “legal” proceedings.430 Most of the 
files contain medical records. Many claimants have companion 
claims, i.e. workers’ compensation, personal injury, etc., where the 
same records are available to the public.431 On appeal, at the court 
level these claims are open. Even when the claimant waives privacy, 
it does not permit the public, and especially the press, to view the 
hearings.432  
 A review of the Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974 S. 
3418 (Public Law 93-579): Source Book on Privacy, Ninety-Fourth 
Congress, 2nd Session (September, 1976) shows that although Social 
Security Numbers were considered when the Act was drafted, there 
was no discussion about applying the Privacy Act to administrative 
hearings and administrative records.433 The Privacy Act applies only 
                                                            
 
" & For the record, I am a FERS employee who would because of my age, get 
no disability benefit if and when I am disabled. 
" ' 5 U.S.C. 552(a). 
"! See Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93-
579): Source Book on Privacy, THE LIBRARY OF CONG., MILITARY LEGAL 
RESOURCES (Sept. 1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/LH_privacy_act-
1974.html. 
"! Id. 
"!  Id. 
"!! Id. 
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to "systems of records," 434 and most adjudicatory and rulemaking 
documents are outside the scope of that term. 
 SSA is more protective of privacy than any other agency, but 
from outside, it appears that it is the agency, rather than the parties 
that craves privacy.435 Decisions by administrative law judges and the 
SSA Appeals Council are rarely published; when so, mostly by 
claimant representatives’ organization.436   
 Because SSA hearings are closed, an aura of mystery surrounds 
the process. Claimants before an agency have a right to know 
whether similar issues have been adjudicated to determine how to 
proceed. They also have a right to know how a judge has handled 
similar cases and for that matter attempt to see whether there is a 
record of decisions that have been remanded or overturned. 
 Other agencies have no problem with the Privacy Act.437 At 
DOL, in the adjudication process, the burden as to privacy is with the 
parties.438  
 Numerous Congressional inquiries regarding “fraud” investigate 
the process.439 “Sunlight” may be the best disinfectant.  SSA should 
                                                            
"!" See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012) (limiting non-disclosure duty to record 
contained in system of records).  
"!# See e.g., Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit 
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part 1), 63 JUDICATURE 60 
(1979) (coining the term "hidden judiciary"); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of 
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477-1530 (2009), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol58/iss7/8. 
"!$ Anecdotally, I am told that even when the claimant may be represented and 
clearly waives the Privacy Act, news media and other members of the public are 
barred from observing hearings by SSA policy. 
"!%  An exception is Medicare appeals. 
"!& From DOL OALJ website: It is the responsibility of counsel and the parties 
to take appropriate action to seek legal protection of information from public 
disclosure to the extent that such protection is available under applicable rules. See, 
e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 18.15 (protective orders); § 18.43(a) (closing of hearing to 
public); § 18.46 (in camera and protective orders); § 18.56 (restricted access order); 
29 C.F.R. § 70.26 (designation of confidential commercial information under 
FOIA). See also FOIA Update, Vol. XIII, No. 3. 
"!'Steve Kroft, Disability, USA, CBS SIXTY MINUTES (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/disability-usa/ (citing to Senator Tom Coburn: 25% 
of recipients are gaming the system).  Although the accusations should include 
DDS, where 75% of the awards are rendered. Citing to the union for administrative 
law judges: lawyers are gaming the system.  Congress concentrates on 
administrative law judges. See Lawmakers urge broad snooping powers for Social 
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publish all administrative law judge and appeals council decisions. 
These can be “sanitized” to conform to the Privacy Act.440 Names 
and SSNs can be redacted. Under FCRP Rule 5.2 (a), unless the court 
orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court that 
contains an individual’s social-security number, taxpayer-
identification number, or birth date, the name of an individual known 
to be a minor, or a financial-account number, a party or nonparty 
making the filing may include only: (1) the last four digits of the 
social-security number and taxpayer-identification number; (2) the 
year of the individual’s birth; (3) the minor’s initials; and (4) the last 
four digits of the financial-account number.441 
 Decisions should be available to the public and especially the 
parties as a matter of right.  Almost all other “final” decisions are 
published. A party appearing before an agency has a right to be able 
to determine whether there is a track record of bias or whether there 
is a track record of reversal at a higher level of review regarding 
disputed issues.442 SSA applies the Privacy Act to its own employees. 
                                                            
Security Administration, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (April 8, 2014); Representative 
Darrell Issa, Reps. James Lankford (R., Okla.), and Jim Jordan (R., Ohio) letter to 
then Acting Commissioner Colvin, July 1, 2014: “We are concerned that your 
testimony indicated a lack of appreciation of the substantial problem created when 
ALJs essentially approve every claimant before them, regardless of whether they 
are disabled or unable to work, and that you lack the commitment to fundamental 
program reform.”  Historically, only a few administrative law judges have been 
charged criminally, but none who were topics of recent Congressional hearings.  
Elizabeth Price was sentenced to eight months in prison for lying to obtain SSA 
benefits for her daughter. Judge Gets Prison Term For Social Security Fraud, 
SFGATE, (Mar. 10, 2000), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SAN-
FRANCISCO-Judge-Gets-Prison-Term-For-Social-2797034.php. Thomas Ploss 
was sentenced to a year in prison for disclosing confidential records to an Evanston 
lawyer who used the information to solicit clients. Judge sentenced for role in 
Social Security scam, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 12, 2003),  
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-12/news/0308120113_1_administrative-
law-judge-district-court-sentenced.  
"" Recordings of Service Observations, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/foia/bluebook/60-0362.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
"" Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2.  
""  ODAR’s Division of Quality Service (DQS) reviews these complaints with 
the assistance of ODAR’s regional office (RO) staff, as appropriate. § 404.940 and 
§ 416.1440, Disqualification of the administrative law judge, sets forth: 
An administrative law judge shall not conduct a hearing if he or 
she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or has any 
interest in the matter pending for decision. If you object to the 
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Administrative law judge and Appeals Council opinions should be 
public. Other agencies do not have a system of acquiescence so even 
when our decisions do not have precedence, or be subject to issue 
preclusion, they may be persuasive as to argument. 
 Again, this proposal will not prevent default of the DI Trust 
Fund, and is not as crucial as the CDR and VR proposals as to 
viability, but as the agency becomes more open, it becomes more 
accountable. If this proposal is combined with expansion of qui tam, 
it may cause more scrutiny and provide a greater reason for the 
public and especially the legal community to support the Trust 
Funds.   
 
VI. Recommendation Six: Consider Adversarial Hearings 
 
 At the administrative law judge level, hearings are procedurally 
“non-adversarial.” Almost all other “formal” adjudications in this 
country are “adversarial” stemming from common law procedures. 
SSA has been using this system from the first hearings in 1940 and 
continued to use them even after passage of the APA in 1946. The 
Social Security Act is a humanitarian statute and is weighted in favor 
of claimants.443 
 The DI cases that judges hear involve substantial amounts of 
money. I estimate that the exposure to the DI Trust Fund in payouts 
                                                            
administrative law judge who will conduct the hearing, you must 
notify the administrative law judge at your earliest opportunity. 
The administrative law judge shall consider your objections and 
shall decide whether to proceed with the hearing or withdraw. If 
he or she withdraws, the Associate Commissioner for Hearings 
and Appeals, or his or her delegate, will appoint another 
administrative law judge to conduct the hearing. If the 
administrative law judge does not withdraw, you may, after the 
hearing, present your objections to the Appeals Council as 
reasons why the hearing decision should be revised or a new 
hearing held before another administrative law judge. 
""! The Social Security Act is a remedial statute that must be liberally 
construed in favor of disability if a disability is proven. Social Security Ruling 
(SSR) 71-30 (“[S]ince the Act is remedial in nature, it should be given a liberal 
construction in order to effectuate its purpose.”). See also Combs v. Gardner, 382 
F.2d 949, 956 (6th Cir.1967); Polly v. Gardner, 364 F.2d 969 (6th Cir.1966); 
Morell E. Mullins, Sr. Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 
ALB. L. REV.9 (2000). Professor Mullins is also author of the Manual for 
Administrative Law Judges, UNIV. OF ARK., http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf. 
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of an average case involving a younger individual with a family is 
about $2 million.444  
 In 1982, SSA initiated a Social Security Administration 
Representation Project (SSARP).445 However in Salling v. Bowen, 
641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986),446 SSARP was issued a 
permanent injunction because the program was improperly 
implemented, as SSA did not initiate the program through APA 
rulemaking. It also: 
 
1. violated SSA regulations, in that it was advertised to be non-
adversarial but was adversarial from the beginning;  
2. did not achieve a stated goal of aiding in the development of 
cases but has, at best, maintained the present system or, at worst, 
tended to cause the ALJs to rely upon the SSARs to the detriment of 
claimants; 
3. did not achieve its goal of improving quality of decisions or 
expediting cases;  
4. did not achieve its goal of increasing productivity;  
5. did not achieve its goal of uniformity;  
6. was in violation of the intention of the Social Security Act.447 
 
                                                            
"""I realize that this is a disputed figure, but value includes family derivative 
benefits. The value of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits for an average 
hypothetical worker with median earnings, who becomes disabled at age 30 
includes $405,000 in Disability Insurance payments and $178,000 in OASI 
payments once the worker converts to retirement benefits. Some claimants with 
higher earnings will obtain double than the average. As stated, this does not include 
benefits for dependents and for survivors. See The Insurance Value of Potential 
Survivor and Disability Benefits for an Illustrative Worker, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
(Sept. 27, 2012).  
Many experts estimate that the insurance value is greater than the actuarial 
value because Social Security benefits are adjusted for inflation and cost-of-living, 
unlike the benefits paid out by most private plans. See Martin R. Holmer, The 
Value of Social Security Disability Insurance, AARP (2001), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2001_09_ssdi.  The Full Returns from Social 
Security WASHINGTON: ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 
http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/publications/pdfs/pb50/ Baker-FullReturns.pdf.  
""#The Social Security Administration and Information Technology, Special 
Report, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1986), https://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/ota86.pdf 
""$ See 42 U.S.C. § 434.  
 
""% Id.  
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 I have been arguing that the program should be re-instituted, after 
agency rulemaking. 448
 Public perception is that the inquisitional model is unfair.449 
Meanwhile, SSA evokes “inconsistency in outcomes” as a 
rationalization to blame judges for failures in delivery and quality of 
disability determinations.450 However, as stated, according to agency 
statistics 75% of awards are paid at lower levels.451 Members of 
Congress have concentrated on attacking the hearing process, rather 
than concentrating on other factors leading to Trust Fund deficits.452 
                                                            
""& This subject has been discussed in Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers, & Paul 
Verkuil, Introducing Nonadversarial Government Representatives to Improve the 
Record of Decision in Social Security Disability Adjudications, SOC. SEC. 
ADVISORY BD. (2003), http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lubbers-
Verkuil.pdf., and more recently by Mr. Morton, see Morton, supra note 9. 
""' Id. 
"# See Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater Consistency in Social 
Security Disability Adjudication: An Empirical Study and Suggested Reforms, 
ACUS (2013), 
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achieving_Greater_Consistency
_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf.  ACUS identified “outlier” administrative law 
judges, defined as two standard deviations above or below the mean, in the low 
range of allowance rates.  
Please note that The Social Security Administration (SSA) has engaged the 
Office of the Chairman of ACUS to: 
• Review and analyze the Social Security Act, as well as 
SSA’s implementing regulations, policies, and practices for 
adjudicating claims under titles II and XVI. 
• Evaluate federal court interpretations and applications of 
SSA’s rules and regulations, noting patterns that show 
consistencies or inconsistencies among appellate and district 
courts. 
• Examine SSA’s acquiescence rulings and how the agency 
applies decisions of federal appellate courts that are at variance 
with SSA’s national policies. 
• Survey federal court practices and procedures for handling 
social security cases to identify varying approaches and 
differential impacts, if any.   
SSA Federal Courts Analysis, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S,, 
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/ssa-federal-courts-analysis (last visited 
Sept 17, 2015). Consultants are Professors Jonah Gelbach  and  David Marcus. 
"# Id. 
"#   Although some of the allegations about some the judges who have been 
“paying down the backlog” may be true, they are statistical “outliers,” and all 
judges are now suspects. For example, in hearings reminiscent of show trials of 
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The ALJ pretext has even been accepted in academia, where one 
noted law professor suggests that to resolve deficits in the disability 
trust fund, the appeals system and the administrative law judge 
position should be abolished.453 
 In “Thinking Outside The APA Box: A New Social Security 
Tribunal,” Professor  
                                                            
1930s Soviet Union, judges have been (as I used to tell juries) inspected, dissected 
and rejected by several Congressional committees.  SSA knew deficits would occur 
and that economics could help to restore the funds:  
Economic conditions influence the number and timing of 
disabled worker claims and awards under the DI program. This 
is true in spite of the fact that the DI program’s definition of 
disability is based on a medical determination of the inability to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity without regard to the 
current state of the economy. Because disability claims have 
historically increased in response to periods of high 
unemployment, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage of 
claims that are allowed would drop under conditions of high 
unemployment. Evidence presented in this note supports that 
expectation. 
The inverse relationship between the allowance rate for disabled 
worker claims filed in a year and the unemployment rate in the 
second prior year is evident in Figure 1. The most recent 
recession which started in 2008 is no exception. The 
unemployment rate rose from 4.6 percent for 2007 to 5.8 percent 
for 2008, and allowance rates for claims filed in 2010 are lower 
than rates for claims filed in 2009. The more dramatic further 
increase in the unemployment rate to 9.3 percent for 2009 
suggests a further drop in allowance rates for claims filed in 
2011. Preliminary data for claims filed in 2011 suggest that 
allowance rates will be lower than in 2010 as expected. 
Stephen C. Goss, Anthony W. Cheng, Michael L. Miller, & Sven H. Sinclair, 
Disabled Worker Allowance Rates: Variation under Changing Economic 
Conditions, Actuarial Note, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 153 (2013). 
"#! Richard J. Pierce, What Should We Do About Social Security Disability 
Appeals?, REGULATION, 41 (2011), 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n3-
3.pdf.  But see Scapegoating Social Security Disability Claimants 
(and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY 
(2012), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Dubin__Rains_-
_Scapegoating_Social_Security_Disability_Claimants.pdf.  
Professor Pierce testified similarly before Congress. 
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Michael Asimow and Judge Jeffrey S. Wolfe creation of a 
separate tribunal to handle the adjudication of disability appeals.454 
The tribunal, headed by a Social Security Chief Judge (SSCJ) would 
be independent of SSA and able to appoint new non-APA “Social 
Security Judges” (SSJs). They state that a number of approaches 
deserve consideration, including:  
(4) introducing government attorneys and adversarial hearings in 
a limited number of case categories; 
“But one additional possibility is to consider whether SSA ALJs 
should become a special “breed” - especially since they make up 
approximately 85% of all ALJs.” 
 Although they list (4) above, Asimow and Wolfe assume that the 
non-adversarial system would be perpetuated.455 
 As currently practiced, by the time a claim reaches the hearing 
level, claimants can address the basis of denial by DDS.456 At DDS, 
speed is usually more important than accuracy. When SSA obtains 
medical records, they do not pay the treating source to write a 
narrative report, which is the gold standard to determine credibility of 
the treating physician. DDS examiners usually do not send the 
physicians appropriate follow-up questions. In some cases, the rules 
elevate the status of the treating physician who may render an 
opinion entitled to controlling weight.  
                                                            
"#" Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs? 38 ADMIN. & 
REG. LAW NEWS, ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRACTICE 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/administrative_law/wint
er_2013.pdf. 
In the same publication as Asimow and Wolfe, Professor Jeffrey Lubbers 
published Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs? would also 
support tailoring a special selection process for SSA ALJs. This could be done in 
two ways—either by a mandate to OPM to provide for specialized hiring of SSA 
ALJs, or by legislatively designating them as “Social Security Judges” and 
allowing SSA to fashion its own hiring process that uses the OPM process as a 
model. See id. at 6, 15. 
"## “In conclusion, [w]e think that the SSA adjudication program’s size, 
backlog, and perhaps the character of its cases, requires some special treatment, 
and, given the informality and non-adversarial nature of the cases, there is ample 
reason to rethink the role and attributes of the adjudicators— at least going 
forward.” 
       "#$ Id.  
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 Further production of evidence is usually entirely one sided.457 A 
claimant can develop tailored evidence to overcome objections at the 
lower level. Besides more recent test results and treatment notes, the 
claimant can provide narrative medical reports and answers to 
tailored interrogatories.458 The lawyer is free to attack the credibility 
of the medical evidence and also the credibility of the individuals 
rendering a negative opinion.  
 If a VE is needed, effective cross-examination can nullify the 
vocational testimony. Claimants are free to call their own medical 
and vocational witnesses. 
 SSA does not develop rebuttal evidence. 
 By the time a case gets to hearing, a good lawyer can create an 
overwhelming record. Even in an imperfect record, after the fact, 
good claimant lawyers may be able to overcome any agency decision 
in the current posture. Under the law, even if claims are appealed and 
lost at every level, including the United States Supreme Court, the 
decision may very well be reopened through modification.459 As 
people get older, it is expected that the human body will deteriorate. 
20 CFR § 404.988 provides that a claim may be opened within a year 
of filing the initial claim for any reason, or within four years for good 
cause.460   Good cause for reopening: 
 
    (a) We will find that there is good cause to reopen a 
determination or decision if -  
   
 (1) New and material evidence is furnished;461 
 
                                                            
"#% I find that most private lawyers will not waste time and money on cases 
they know will be losers. This may be the principal reason that many claimants are 
pro se. I also recommend that pro se claimants should be sent to representatives. At 
one time, legal services filled this duty; more recently they cannot due to a lack of 
funding.  
"#& Some of the lawyers who used to appear before me, presented a “sworn 
statement” which is actually a one-sided deposition of the treating physician. The 
questioning would usually track the sequential evaluation. In most cases, if the 
claimant presented a combination of severe impairments, the physician was 
questioned whether or not a listed impairment was equaled.  
"#' 20 C.F.R. § 404.989. 
"$ Id. 
"$ Id. 
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New evidence very well may contain supportive narrative reports 
or statements from physicians whose opinions were discounted in the 
case decision. 
 The percentage of claimants, who are represented, has 
skyrocketed at the same time that receipts have increased due to the 
2008 recession.462 SSA permits withholding of past due benefits to 
pay representatives fees if a standard form attorney’s fee contract is 
filed.463 At the same time that SSA became less concerned with 
accuracy and more concerned with backlogs, in 2004, the agency and 
Congress relaxed rules governing representation, making it easier for 
non-lawyer advocates to get paid.464 Some large firms hired brigades 
of non-lawyers, and advertised nationally.465  See Table 3 for “Top 
Reps” in 2010. All made in excess of $1.5 million in FY 2010.466 In 
2010, administrative law judges complained to Congress; they 
accused some firms of doctoring records and withholding 
unsupportive medical evidence as a matter of course.467 After it was 
bought by a hedge fund, in December, 2014, the top ranked firm, 
with about 57,000 clients and approximately 900 employees in 13 
states declared bankruptcy.468 
                                                            
"$   Compilation Of The Social Security Laws, Part B- Procedural and 
General Provisions, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title16b/1631.htm. 
"$! Id. 
"$" Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold In U.S. 
Disability System, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 11, 2011) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046
.  
"$# Oversight of Rising Social Security Disability Claims and The Role of 
Administrative Law Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, 
Health Care and Entitlements of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t H.R., 113th 
Cong. 75-77 (2013) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113hhrg82276/html/CHRG-113hhrg82276.htm  (statement of Hon. J.E. Sullivan, 
A.L.J., Office of Hearings, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.).  See also, Paletta and Searcey, , 
supra note 469. 
"$$ See Table 3 for “Top Reps” in 2010. 
"$% Id. 
"$& Jonathan LaMantia, Binder & Binder files for bankruptcy: One of the 
nation's largest Social Security disability firms had to reduce institutional debt 
after payments from the federal government slowed, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS 
(Dec. 19, 2014),  
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141219/PROFESSIONAL_SERVICES/1
41219807/binder-binder-files-for-bankruptcy. 
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 It is reasonable to expect that many of the representation abuses 
will abate if representatives are required to justify their fees.  
 I also think that good prosecutors may be able to guide 
settlements. As started earlier, SSA DI is an all or nothing 
proposition. But it may be feasible in some cases, to work out a VR 
plan through the principles in Recommendation Number Three that 
will satisfy the claimant. Administrative law judges should be given 
authority to approve such plans.469 
 Prosecutors may also be able to perform further discovery. As 
stated, at present SSA does not obtain rebuttal evidence. 470Newer 
evidence may be needed. It may be that new evidence will 
substantiate the claimant’s position and there may not be a need for a 
hearing. The parties may agree to further testing or another form of 
evaluation. 
 Further the parties can reduce the degree of difficulty in rendering 
a decision and reducing it to writing by presenting binding 
stipulations.471 A summary decision rule would permit easy cases to 
be awarded as soon as the evidence is collected. Also, a judge should 
be able to require an Order to Show cause regarding whether there is 
evidence to substantiate a “severe” impairment. See 
Recommendation Four A regarding step 2 of the sequential 
evaluation.472  
 I do not think that conversion to an adversarial process will affect 
the DI Trust Fund immediately, but it will bring some stability to the 
system. The CBO in 2012 Policy Options stated that in the short term 
it would add certain costs for hiring and training but, might, over the 
long run result in lower spending for the program because fewer 
                                                            
"$' See also supra Recommendation Three in text.  
"% Rebuttal Procedures and Presumed Maximum Value (PMW) Rule, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203910040 (last revised Aug. 
18, 2015).  
"% Under current practice the records often contain hundreds, if not thousands 
of pages of raw hospital and other treatment records that may/ may not been culled 
for duplicates and other procedural flaws. In an adversarial setting, the parties can 
be required to present medical and other evidence summaries, and the parties can 
be required to comment on the accuracy. I argue that most of the employee time 
spent currently on developing records is completely unnecessary.  Administrative 
law judges should be given authority to rely on medical summaries and stipulated 
evidence. 
"%  See supra Recommendation Four in text. 
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people would be admitted.473  “However, the effects that any of those 
modifications would have on the disability determination process are 
uncertain, and CBO did not estimate the budgetary impact.”474   
 As I envision it, administrative law judges will be able to devote 
their time and energy on hearing and deciding cases more 
expeditiously.475 I do not think the CBO took procedural reforms into 
effect. Both speed and accuracy will increase so if SSA remains 
devoted to judicial “production,” this recommendation will yield it. If 
opened to public scrutiny, this recommendation will improve public 
confidence that the system is not rife with fraud and ripe for failure. 
At this time, because there is no basis for comparison, I recommend, 
as stated earlier, that Congress reinstate and improve on SSARP 
rather than immediately adopt the adversary process without testing 
it.476 I think that Recommendations One and Two are as close to sure 
things as simple mathematics in this dimension can offer.477 I think 
that Recommendation can completely change how claims are decided 
at Step 5 of the sequential evaluation.478 
 However, if an adversarial outcome yields one (1) less affirmed 
case per year per judge @ $2,000,000 x 1400 judges = $280,000,000 
in future savings.479  I argue that the costs for a demonstration project 
will yield far greater savings than expenditures. This can be another 
boon to future DI Trust Fund prospects. 
 Anticipating objections that imposition of the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA), when successful claimants are entitled to fees for 
prosecution of the claim in an adversarial system, will require greater 
                                                            
"%!  Similar to Professor Lubbers, they suggest modifying the selection criteria 
for administrative law judges, increasing the length of their training, and improving 
the consistency of training among localities. Another example of a possible change 
in the program’s administrative procedures involves altering the hearing process. 
Professor Lubbers would add a new classification of administrative judges rather 
than administrative law judges.   
"%",Testimony: The Social Security Disability Insurance Program, CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-
2013-2014/reports/43995_DI-testimony_one-column.pdf.  
"%# I suspect that far fewer hearings will need to be held. Although prosecutors 
need to be hired, fewer administrative law judges will eventually be needed. 
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payouts, any exposure for EAJA fees will pale compared to the 
projected savings.480 Under EAJA, the statutory cap is $125 per 
hour.481 Moreover, any recovery would be offset by the amount 
awarded in back benefits under an approved fee agreement, which 
are, on average, about 20% of recovery.482 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Although recipients and applicants for DI may be relieved by 
passage of the savings bill, however that does not mean that the Fund 
will be safe. For a 2-year period (FY 2016 and FY 2017), the 
legislation  increases discretionary spending by $80 billion, split 
evenly between defense and nondefense programs, above the Budget 
Control Act (BCA) (P.L. 11225) sequester-level spending caps.  
Sequester relief of $50 billion will be applied to FY 2016 and $30 
billion to FY 2017.483 What will happen after that is speculative. The 
vote was not unanimous. The House voted 266 to 167.  The Senate 
vote was 64 to 35. 484 Many “nay” members of Congress wanted 
default.  
There are few investments that can yield $9 for every $1 spent. 
VR analysis at time of DI application holds this promise. See 
Recommendations Two and Three. Congress has, on the taxpayers’ 
behalf, rejected the investment. Instead, in the name of austerity, 
some members intend to cut current investments. Utilizing some of 
the recommendations, especially Recommendation Three, could 
possibly yield over $100 for each dollar spent. Recommendations 
One to Three could actually serve to stimulate the economy. 
 If the DI Trust Fund defaults, current and prospective recipients 
would receive only about 80% of their current income.485 As I stated 
                                                            
"& I-1-2-91, Equal Access to Justice Act, Social Security, 
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-01/I-1-2-91.html. 
"& Meanwhile, I hear cases involving some lawyers in fee shifting cases who 
can justify a fee based on more than $400 per hour. A couple of lawyers who have 
appeared before me, bill their defense clients in excess of $1000 per hour. I don’t 
think that these lawyers will take an EAJA case. 
"&  28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 d(2)(A) (2015). 
"&! Congress Passes H.R. 1314, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, supra note 
1. 
"&" Id. 
"&# Ehrenfreund, supra note 6. See also  Statement of Inspector Gen. O’Carroll 
Jr., supra note 112. 
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previously, most Americans, even those who pay FICA taxes do not 
understand the difference between DI and SSI. They are often 
depicted in Congress and by the media as unworthy.486 There is a 
tendency in some quarters to label them as “takers.”487 Actually, 
those DI recipients who worked and paid are currently and fully 
insured.488 Their benefits are based on an earnings record and on 
meeting strict conditions of a social insurance policy. Although most 
of them justifiably relied on promises that the Trust fund would be 
protected, DI recipients will suffer most if a default occurs.  
 When SSI was created in 1973 by the Nixon Administration, a 
vocal minority expressed displeasure with “Federalism,” and wanted 
                                                            
"&$ See Jonathan P. Baird, My Turn: The art of hating the poor, CONCORD 
MONITOR (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/17046621-95/my-
turn-the-art-of-hating-the-poor. “Being hostile to poor people is a long American 
tradition. Historically, the American people have fluctuated between a desire to 
help the deserving needy and an alternating desire to castigate and punish the 
undeserving poor. The tension between these conflicting desires lies behind public 
policy disputes about poverty and what to do about it.” Baird is an administrative 
law judge, assigned to SSA. “The view is not one that sees poverty as a result of 
misfortune or social class. It is about bad persons. Poverty is seen as a willful result 
of personal deficiencies, laziness and vice.” 
On the Investment Watch blog, this comment is typical: 
Darkwing: “Most of the people on SS disability, never put a 
dime in the fund. I know dozens of people over the years, that 
are getting disibility [sic] pay check and never worked in their 
lives. Total scum.” 
Social Security Disability Payments to be Cut?, INVESTMENT WATCH (2015), 
http://investmentwatchblog.com/social-security-disability-payments-to-be-cut/  
"&% See John Attarian, Essays In Political Economy The Roots of The Social 
Security Myth, LUDWIG VON MISES INSTITUTE 1, 53 (2001), 
https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Roots%20of%20the%20Social%20Security%20
Myth_2.pdf. – “Social Security has had a very corrosive and degrading effect on our 
national character. Instead of fostering fortitude and self-reliance, it has encouraged 
whiny dependence. It has made Americans first servile and then petulant in their 
relations with their government: tamely submitting to crushing tax burdens in their 
productive years under the deliberately-cultivated delusion that they were buying 
something for themselves, and in their retirement years, railing at any attempt, 
however innocuous, to trim benefits. Its zero-sum finance, whereby the 
beneficiary’s gain is inescapably the taxpayer’s loss, has made the old callous 
toward the program’s burdens on the young, and the young resentful of the old. It is 
telling that the sour epithet ’greedy geezer’ was unknown in America until the 
elderly mobilized in the 1970s and 1980s  to protect Social Security.” Id. at 53. 
"&& Id. 
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to retain independent state disability systems.489 In compromise, 
funds for the development of claims mostly are spent at the DDS, 
state agency level. In the main, most SSI claimants benefitted from 
federalizing the state claims. I do not address SSI viability, 
longstanding arguments that the DDS system should be nationalized, 
or whether SSI adjudication should be returned to the states.   
 More recently, antagonism over federalization has risen and is the 
basis for much of the exaggerations and distortions about SSA.490 
Many pundits had predicted that the Trust Funds would have dried up 
by now.491 Some Administrations, like proverbial foxes in charge, 
added to the folklore. Inaction between 2001 – 2009, combined with 
a “pay down the backlog” attitude, and a swelling of the rolls, is 
sometimes confabulated by agency incompetence and outright fraud. 
To a reasonable degree of certainty, “indolence” regarding the 
impending DI Trust Fund default appears to have been planned as 
part of the privatization effort. Likewise, the Budget Control Act of 
2011 (BCA), especially cutting CDR funding, was penny wise and 
pound foolish and accelerated entropy.492   
 From the onset of the Fund, generations of Americans were told 
that there would be nothing left for them when they needed it. Many 
baby boomers who paid their FICA and are now vested had believed 
                                                            
"&' Id. 
"'  Some argue that FICA is not insurance but coercive redistribution of 
wealth. See Attarian supra note 492, “Abolition of this tax is essential for 
exploding the false consciousness. [Under Attarian’s plan] [t]hose born after 1945 
would lose their Social Security benefits and would have to recognize the OASDI 
taxes they have already paid for what they are—redistributive transfers. On the 
other hand, they would be free to make their own arrangements for old age with the 
money they now pay in Social Security taxes. A less severe option would be to 
permit people after 1945 to make a free choice between receiving their benefits or 
receiving tax lifetime exemptions equal to or greater than accumulated benefits.” 
Pp. 52-53. See also Greenspan, supra note 6. Ironically, Greenspan, a philosophical 
opponent to the concept, was Chair of the National Commission on Social Security 
Reform, which “fixed” the trust funds in 1983. Greenspan Commission: Report of 
the Nat’l Commission on Social Security Reform,  
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1983), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/gspan.html.  
+,) Id. 
+,* Kathy Ruffing, Failure to Fund Disability Reviews Is Penny Wise and 
Pound Foolish, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/failure-to-fund-disability-reviews-is-penny-wise-and-
pound-foolish. 
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these tales of woe. They never expected to be entitled to anything. 
They voted for candidates who also believed in doom. But they now 
must be pleasantly surprised that their FICA payments have turned 
out to have been a sound investment, and they can now receive DI (or 
retirement) benefits.  
 However, due to exigent circumstances, pain may well be 
imminent. The vast majority of DI recipients are innocent. Congress 
needs to protect their investments. 
 Millions of recipients may fall from DI to SSDC, partly within 
the SSI category, due to declining income and resources. This could 
put further pressure on the general funds of the United States. In 
some states DI receipts constitute a large part of the local economy. 
DI default will add pressure to have local entities pick up the tab. 
Because there will be less money in circulation, unemployment will 
occur. It is also reasonable to expect that the current adjudication 
system will need to be revamped. 
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Table 4.A2 Disability Insurance, 1957–2013 (in millions of dollars) 
Year 
Receipts a Expenditures Assets 
Total 
Net payroll 
tax 
contributio
ns b 
Income 
from 
taxation of 
benefits 
Transfers from 
the general fund 
of the 
Treasury c 
Net 
interest d Total 
Benefit 
payment
s e 
Administrative 
expenses 
Transfers to 
Railroad 
Retirement 
program 
Net 
increase 
during 
year 
Amount 
at end 
of year 
1957 709 702 . . . . . . 7 59 57 3 . . . 649 649 
1958 991 966 . . . . . . 25 261 249 12 . . . 729 1,379 
1959 931 891 . . . . . . 40 485 457 50 -22 447 1,825 
1960 1,063 1,010 . . . . . . 53 600 568 36 -5 464 2,289 
1961 1,104 1,038 . . . . . . 66 956 887 64 5 148 2,437 
1962 1,114 1,046 . . . . . . 68 1,183 1,105 66 11 -69 2,368 
1963 1,165 1,099 . . . . . . 66 1,297 1,210 68 20 -133 2,235 
1964 1,218 1,154 . . . . . . 64 1,407 1,309 79 19 -188 2,047 
1965 1,247 1,188 . . . . . . 59 1,687 1,573 90 24 -440 1,606 
1966 2,079 2,006 . . . 16 58 1,947 1,784 137 25 133 1,739 
1967 2,379 2,286 . . . 16 78 2,089 1,950 109 31 290 2,029 
1968 3,454 3,316 . . . 32 106 2,458 2,311 127 20 996 3,025 
1969 3,792 3,599 . . . 16 177 2,716 2,557 138 21 1,075 4,100 
1970 4,774 4,481 . . . 16 277 3,259 3,085 164 10 1,514 5,614 
1971 5,031 4,620 . . . 50 361 4,000 3,783 205 13 1,031 6,645 
1972 5,572 5,107 . . . 51 414 4,759 4,502 233 24 813 7,457 
1973 6,443 5,932 . . . 52 458 5,973 5,764 190 20 470 7,927 
1974 7,378 6,826 . . . 52 500 7,196 6,957 217 22 182 8,109 
1975 8,035 7,444 . . . 90 502 8,790 8,505 256 29 -754 7,354 
1976 8,757 8,233 . . . 103 422 10,366 10,055 285 26 -1,609 5,745 
1977 9,570 9,138 . . . 128 304 11,945 11,547 399 -1 -2,375 3,370 
1978 13,810 13,413 . . . 142 256 12,954 12,599 325 30 856 4,226 
1979 15,590 15,114 . . . 118 358 14,186 13,786 371 30 1,404 5,630 
1980 13,871 13,255 . . . 130 485 15,872 15,515 368 -12 -2,001 3,629 
1981 17,078 16,738 . . . 168 172 17,658 17,192 436 29 -580 3,049 
1982 22,715 21,995 . . . 174 546 17,992 17,376 590 26 f -358 2,691 
1983 20,682 17,991 . . . 1,121 1,569 18,177 17,524 625 28 2,505 5,195 
1984 17,309 15,503 190 441 1,174 18,546 17,898 626 22 -1,237 3,959 
1985 19,301 17,014 222 1,195 870 19,478 18,827 608 43 f 2,363 6,321 
1986 19,439 18,247 238 152 803 20,522 19,853 600 68 f 1,459 7,780 
1987 20,303 19,538 -36 153 648 21,425 20,519 849 57 -1,122 6,658 
1988 22,699 21,837 61 202 600 22,494 21,695 737 61 206 6,864 
1989 24,795 23,797 95 196 707 23,753 22,911 754 88 1,041 7,905 
1990 28,791 28,403 144 -639 883 25,616 24,829 707 80 3,174 11,079 
1991 30,390 29,128 190 9 1,063 28,571 27,695 794 82 1,819 12,898 
1992 31,430 30,148 232 -12 1,062 32,004 31,112 834 58 -574 12,324 
1993 32,301 31,182 281 4 835 35,662 34,613 966 83 -3,361 8,963 
1994 52,841 51,372 311 1 1,157 38,879 37,744 1,029 106 13,962 22,925 
1995 56,696 54,404 341 -207 2,158 42,055 40,923 1,064 68 14,641 37,566 
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Table 4.A2 Disability Insurance, 1957–2013 (in millions of dollars) 
Year 
Receipts a Expenditures Assets 
Total 
Net payroll 
tax 
contributio
ns b 
Income 
from 
taxation of 
benefits 
Transfers from 
the general fund 
of the 
Treasury c 
Net 
interest d Total 
Benefit 
payment
s e 
Administrative 
expenses 
Transfers to 
Railroad 
Retirement 
program 
Net 
increase 
during 
year 
Amount 
at end 
of year 
1996 60,710 57,325 373 g 3,012 45,351 44,189 1,160 2 15,359 52,924 
1997 60,499 56,037 470 g 3,992 47,034 45,695 1,280 59 13,465 66,389 
1998 64,357 58,966 558 g 4,832 49,931 48,207 1,567 157 14,425 80,815 
1999 69,541 63,203 661 g 5,677 53,035 51,381 1,519 135 16,507 97,321 
2000 77,920 71,093 721 -836 6,942 56,782 54,983 1,639 159 21,138 118,459 
2001 83,903 74,933 811 g 8,158 61,369 59,618 1,741 10 22,534 140,993 
2002 87,379 77,272 930 g 9,178 67,905 65,702 2,049 154 19,475 160,468 
2003 88,074 77,442 944 g 9,689 73,108 70,933 2,008 167 14,966 175,434 
2004 91,380 80,281 1,111 g 9,988 80,597 78,229 2,152 215 10,783 186,217 
2005 97,423 86,077 1,073 g 10,273 88,018 85,365 2,315 338 9,405 195,623 
2006 102,641 90,808 1,230 g 10,603 94,456 91,741 2,326 388 8,185 203,808 
2007 109,854 95,243 1,393 8 13,210 98,778 95,865 2,468 445 11,076 214,884 
2008 109,840 97,566 1,313 g 10,961 108,951 106,007 2,526 418 889 215,773 
2009 109,283 96,865 1,955 g 10,463 121,506 118,315 2,743 448 -12,223 203,550 
2010 104,017 92,511 1,852 363 9,292 127,660 124,216 2,982 462 -23,643 179,907 
2011 106,276 81,881 1,581 14,927 7,887 132,332 128,948 2,920 465 -26,056 153,850 
2012 109,115 85,615 583 16,546 6,371 140,299 136,897 2,890 512 -31,184 122,666 
2013 111,228 105,402 391 729 4,706 143,450 140,130 2,769 551 -32,221 90,445 
SOURCE: Department of the Treasury. 
a. The definitions of the categories "net payroll tax contributions" and "reimbursements from the general fund of the Treasury" were revised in 
2011. Data in these two columns for 1984 and later may vary from those in prior editions, but total receipts are unchanged. b. Beginning in 1983, 
includes transfers from the general fund of the Treasury representing contributions that would have been paid on deemed wage credits for 
military service in 1957–2001, if such credits were considered to be covered wages. c. Includes payments (1) in 1966 and later, for costs of 
noncontributory wage credits for military service performed before 1957; (2) in 1971–1982, for costs of deemed wage credits for military service 
performed after 1956; (3) in 1968 and later, for costs of benefits to certain uninsured persons who attained age 72 before 1968; (4) in 1984 for 
employees, and in 1984–1989 for self-employed persons, for payroll tax credits provided under Public Law 98-21; and (5) in 2010–2012, for 
payroll tax revenue forgone under the provisions of Public Laws 111-147, 111-312, 112-78, and 112-96. d. Includes net profits or losses on 
marketable securities; interest adjustments on amounts reimbursed from, or paid to, other trust funds or the general fund of the Treasury; and 
relatively small amounts of gifts to the fund. e. Beginning in 1966, includes payments for vocational rehabilitation services furnished to disabled 
persons receiving benefits because of their disabilities. Beginning in 1983, amounts are reduced by amount of reimbursement for unnegotiated 
benefit checks. f. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund borrowed from the Disability Insurance and Hospital Insurance Trust Funds 
in 1982, and repaid the borrowed amounts in 1985 and 1986. Amounts for these years are equal to total receipts less total expenditures, plus 
amounts borrowed or less amounts repaid. g. Between -$500,000 and $500,000.493 
 !+)*-					( 239
SEC. 102. SOCIAL SECURITY . 
(a) Social Security Revenues- For purposes of Senate enforcement 
under sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
the amounts of revenues of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust 
Fund are as follows: 
Fiscal year 2016: 
$792,776,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2017: 
$824,342,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2018: 
$857,154,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2019: 
$890,609,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2020: 
$925,760,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2021:     
$962,188,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2022: 
$1,000,637,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2023: 
$1,040,394,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2024: 
$1,081,476,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2025: 
$1,123,748,000,000.
(b) Social Security Outlays- For purposes of Senate enforcement 
under sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
the amounts of outlays of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust 
Fund are as follows: 
Fiscal year 2016: 
$778,032,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2017: 
$825,829,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2018: 
$882,521,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2019: 
$941,034,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2020: 
$1,005,632,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2021: 
$1,073,227,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2022: 
$1,145,188,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2023: 
$1,222,754,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2024: 
$1,305,622,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2025: 
$1,394,327,000,000. 
(c) Social Security Administrative Expenses- In the Senate, the 
amounts of new budget authority and budget outlays of the Federal 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal 
Disability Insurance Trust Fund for administrative expenses are as 
follows: 
Fiscal year 2016: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,026,000,000. 
 
 
(B) Outlays, 
$5,089,000,000. 
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Fiscal year 2017: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,175,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$5,190,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2018: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,345,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$5,316,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2019: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,518,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$5,487,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2020: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,699,000,000. 
B) Outlays, $5,668,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2021: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$5,881,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$5,849,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2022: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$6,072,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$6,039,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2023: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$6,266,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$6,232,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2024: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$6,462,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$6,428,000,000. 
Fiscal year 2025: 
(A) New budget authority, 
$6,665,000,000. 
(B) Outlays, 
$6,630,000,000.493 
                                                            
"'! S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. 
§ 102 (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s
conres11/BILLS-
114sconres11es.pdf. 
 
 !+)*-					( 241
 
TOP REPS 
The Social Security Administration pays legal firms directly for 
successfully winning disability benefits for their clients. Here are the 
top 10 individuals collecting fees from 2010. 
Name 2010 payments Based Comment? 
Charles 
Binder 
$22,817,430.62 Hauppauge, 
N.Y. 
Declined to comment 
Thomas 
Nash 
$6,292,296.41 Chicago Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Eric Conn $3,815,512.96 Stanville, 
Ky. 
Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Michael 
Sullivan 
$3,614,429.13 Lousiville, 
Ky.  
Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Frank 
Latour 
$3,464,262.24 Colton, 
Calif. 
Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Ronald 
Miller 
$3,241,150.42 Santa 
Monica, 
Calif. 
A spokesman for Disability 
Group, the firm run by Mr. 
Miller, said, 'Statistically, 
claimants who employ an 
attorney to represent them 
are much more likely to win 
than those who go 
unrepresented.  We are 
proud of the results we have 
achieved for our clients, 
helping them obtain justly 
deserved benefits.  The $3.2 
million is for the work 
performed by our national 
firm to help clients achieve 
their deserved benefits.' 
Juan 
Hernandez 
Rivera 
$2,816,311.80 Bayamon, 
Puerto Rico 
Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Robert 
Friedman 
$2,531,046.93 Seattle Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
 
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Matthew 
Greenbaum 
$2,004,375.65 New 
Orleans 
Didn't respond to request for 
comment 
Thomas 
Bothwell 
$1,668,758.92 Yakima, 
Wash. 
Declined to comment 
Source: Social Security Administration. 494 
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"'" Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold In U.S. 
Disability System, WALL ST. J.  (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046
. 
